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This research uses a grounded theory approach to study the phenomenon of hacktivism 
and seeks to understand how the Internet has evolved to become a disproportionate and 
significant platform for disruption. Technological advancements involving the Internet, 
such as social media, have provided a significant advantage for social activists to advance 
their causes and enables them to recruit large masses with little effort. This platform also 
provides the distinct advantage of anonymity and increased availability of malicious tools 
and malware that, if directed toward U.S. critical infrastructure, could potentially cause 
severe economic and physical harm to the homeland. This research will also provide 
readers an in-depth analysis of three well-known social movements that have revealed the 
potential for increasing violence and/or disruption. The civil rights movements of the 
1960s and the environmentalist movements of the 1980s are examples of activist 
movements that quickly evolved into direct action networks. Such historical context, 
when compared to current hacktivist collectives like Anonymous, suggests that social 
activist movements, regardless of venue, possess the cognitive praxis to cause injury or 
harm in furtherance of a social cause. 
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There has been a limited amount of research conducted on the potential for hacktivism 
and collectives like Anonymous to continue to evolve into a potent homeland security 
threat. Hacktivism has become increasingly prominent over the last few years and has 
been largely ignored as a potential threat to the critical infrastructure in the United States 
despite its own repeated warnings. This thesis focuses on the potential for hacktivism to 
emerge into more disruptive movements and whether such web based collectives are 
distinctly advantaged over previous social movements. As America’s critical 
infrastructure becomes increasingly entwined with the global web, it is important to 
understand whether hacktivist movements possess the praxis to become an increasingly 
disruptive global force and threat to America’s homeland.  
Currently, homeland security officials target hacktivists after they have already 
engaged in disruptive behavior often times at great expense to America’s corporate and 
government sectors. However, this strategy fails to recognize the fact that unlike previous 
terrestrial social movements, web-based hacktivist groups are distinctly advantaged at 
formulating collective action on a global scale. Evolving out of an online collective, 
hacktivists take advantage of weaponized malware and tools to cause disruptive acts, 
often times leading to tens of millions of dollars in loss to private and corporate sector 
companies in America. As a global collective, targeting one or more hacktivists does not 
eliminate the threat since the Internet provides access to an infinite and resilient resource 
capable of extending the life cycle of the hacktivist’s action and threat.  
This research uses a grounded theory approach to study the phenomenon of 
hacktivism and seeks to understand how the Internet has evolved to become a 
disproportionate and significant platform for disruption. Technological advancements 
involving the Internet, such as social media, have provided a significant advantage for 
social activists to advance their cause enabling them to recruit large masses with little 
effort. This platform also provides the distinct advantage of anonymity and increased 
availability of malicious tools and malware that, if directed towards U.S. critical 
infrastructure, could potentially cause severe economic and physical harm to the 
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homeland. This research will also provide readers an in depth analysis of three well-
known social movements that have revealed the potential for increasing violence and/or 
disruption. The civil rights movements of the 1960s and the environmentalist movements 
of the 1980s are two examples of activist movements that quickly evolved into direct 
action networks. Such historical context when compared to current hacktivist collectives 
suggests that social activist movements, regardless of venue, possess the cognitive praxis 
to cause injury or harm in furtherance of a social cause. 
This thesis is not intended to argue or necessitate action against online activism 
but rather increase awareness for an underappreciated threat that is likely to continue to 
evolve into a more disruptive force. In 2011, the “re-imagined and re-invigorated specter 
of ‘“hacktivism’” rose to haunt organizations around the world” supplanting the cyber 
criminal and state sponsored hacker as the most prevalent threat on the Internet.1 The 
actual threat posed by the hacktivist is subject to much debate; however, increased 
hacktivist activities suggest that the security environment in cyberspace is changing.   
The rise of hacktivism is no accident. Technological advancements involving the 
Internet, such as social media, have provided a significant advantage for activists to 
advance their cause, which enables them to recruit large masses with little effort. This 
platform also provides the distinct advantage of anonymity, a luxury not previously 
enjoyed by leaders of traditional social movements. More concerning; however, is the 
increasing availability of malicious tools and malware that, if directed towards U.S. 
critical infrastructure, could potentially cause severe economic and physical harm to the 
homeland. However, what makes hacktivism unique and different from criminal 
organizations is also what makes it more challenging. The lack of structure to the 
hacktivist movement is the basis for its strength and potential for increasing its 
dangerousness. Hacktivism, unlike the organized criminal group and nation state, is a 
leaderless phenomenon that has little accountability. This amorphous nature limits our 
                                                 




ability to predict the trajectory of hacktivist actions since leaderless movements lack 
direction and discipline.2  
Hacktivist actions are learned in the social environment and through social 
interaction. As activist societies exist in complex social environments and adapt 
themselves to these environments, the hacktivist adapts within the virtual cyber 
environment. Recent data breach reports suggest hacktivist groups are evolving from 
peaceful online protest action towards more aggressive and disruptive acts.3 
In 2013, the hacktivist group Anonymous secretly accessed U.S. government 
computers and stole sensitive information in a yearlong campaign with yet to be 
determined consequences.4 The easy availability of cyber based weapons have been used 
by hacktivists to cause millions of dollars in damage to government and private and 
commercial sector companies and organizations that are currently disadvantaged in 
defending against the nature of the hacktivists threat. Purposeful use of these weapons 
has already caused significant harm to critical infrastructure in nations like Iran, Estonia 
and the U.S.; however, hacktivists have yet to join the fray.  
Much like terrestrial based social movements, hacktivist groups like Anonymous 
are challenged by its diversity of membership and the number of competing issues that 
dilute its debate. Online collectives purposely use discourse and debate to increase issue 
awareness and identify those issues with a need for action. However, much like terrestrial 
based social movements, harmful acts defeat their purpose offering requiring restraint to 
maintain the support of its majority. This mainstream effort isolates more extreme 
members within the movement who, now unaligned with the majority, are forced to 
splinter form the group to carry out more violent, or in the case of hacktivism, more 
disruptive action.   
                                                 
2 Thomas Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
3 Francios Paget, Cybercrime and Hacktivism, McAfee Labs, 
http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-cybercrime-hactivism.pdf. 
4 “FBI Warns That Anonymous Has Hacked US Government Sites for a Year,” The Guardian, 
November 16, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/16/anonymous-fbi. 
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Projecting the course of hacktivism is difficult; however, this thesis has shown 
that social movements, regardless of venue, have the praxis to evolve and splinter into 
more radical groups. Purposeful actions are carried out by minority members who 
formulate their own clusters based upon ideology and competence. For hacktivists, the 
Internet accelerates the process of collective identity. The threat is realized from resulting 
small clusters that splinter from the majority in order to sustain a secure operating 
environment and endorse more forceful action. Resulting law enforcement actions against 
these groups do not necessarily reflect failure of the movement since, as noted by 
Christina Foust assistant professor of communication studies at the University of Denver, 
such repressive effects “are felt as a reclamation of agency and autonomy in the present, 
as well as the future.”5 Thus, the transgressive clusters within Anonymous and other 
activist movements have ability to inspire future action. The provocative comments of 
members of Anonymous subsequent to the arrests of many of its members suggest a 
natural evolution of the web-based social movement. Anonymous and other Internet 
based movements have a never-ending pool of resource. To successfully control them 
will require even greater resource suggesting, “hacktivism cannot be stopped any more 
than activism can.”6 The vulnerability of the Internet, availability of cyber based 
weapons, and threat of imminent action signals a hacktivist threat that is very real. 
 
 
                                                 
5 Christina R. Foust, Transgression as a Mode of Resistance: Rethinking Social Movement in an Era of 
Corporate Globalization (London: Lexington Books, 2010). 
6 Michael Colesky, and Johan Van Niekerk, Hacktivism: Controlling The Effects (Port Elizabeth, 
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A. THE PROBLEM 
This thesis explores whether social and technological advancement involving the 
Internet have increased the threat posed by hacktivists to our homeland and whether such 
web-based activist movements can evolve into more serious disruptive actors. Today’s 
technological advancements would enable a cyber activist, if so willing, to utilize 
increasingly sophisticated cyber tools to further the activist cause. This research will 
attempt to provide a better understanding of the Internet as a platform for disruption and 
whether web-based social movements have the praxis to evolve and/or splinter into 
increasingly more disruptive forces for change. 
Globalization would be difficult to imagine without the creation of the Internet.7 
The Internet provides methods of communication that enable people from opposite ends 
of the globe to openly exchange information and share ideas. However, while the Internet 
has proved to be “largely resilient to attacks and other disruptions so far,” the increased 
connectivity and reliance on the web suggests a changing environment for disruption.8 
Today, a threat through the Internet means a threat to everything.9 Yet, despite this 
increased risk, web-based social movements continue to evolve online with increasing 
sophistication and resiliency. Groups like Anonymous have caused hundreds of millions 
of dollars in damage and lost revenue to government and private sector entities with little 
or no remedy. Defending against such threats is difficult at best and will likely remain 
that way with increased availability and sophistication of web-based weapons and tools. 
As threat actors on the web, it is worthwhile to study hacktivist movements and the level 
of risk posed by such groups. What role does the Internet play in the creation of these 
groups and the decision to formulate action? Are web-based social movements 
                                                 
7 National Council on Economic Education, Thinking Globally: Effective Lessons for Teaching about 
the Interdependent World Economy: Lesson 1: Ten Basic Questions about Globalisation (New York: 
National Council on Economic Education, 2005), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/center/students/hs/think/lesson1.pdf. 
8 World Economic Forum, Global Risks 2014, 9th ed. (Geneva, Switzerland: World Economic Forum, 
2014), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalRisks_Report_2014.pdf, 38. 
9 Ibid., 39. 
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significantly advantaged over terrestrial-based movements such that their very existence 
implies an increased security risk to the homeland?  
There is a limited body of literature that discusses hacktivism in the context of 
social movements and how web-based movements may evolve. By studying the evolution 
of social movements, this thesis will attempt to identify possible trigger points or casual 
factors for increased risk of violence in social movements. These findings, when applied 
to hacktivism, will possibly reveal whether the praxis exists for cyber activists to increase 
their disruptive actions concurrent with the increasing sophistication of Internet based 
tools and software capabilities. In further describing the nature of the Internet based 
threat, research will be conducted to identify potential factors that distinguish hacktivism 
as an increased risk from other activist movements.  
B. BACKGROUND 
In 2011, the “re-imagined and re-invigorated specter of ‘hacktivism’ rose to haunt 
organizations around the world” supplanting the cyber criminal and state sponsored 
hacker as the most prevalent threat on the Internet.10 The actual threat posed by the 
hacktivist is subject to much debate; however, increased hacktivist activities suggest that 
the security environment in cyberspace is changing. The phrase hacktivism was first 
coined by the hacker collective Cult of the Dead Cow and was intended to refer to the use 
of technology to foster human rights and the open exchange of information.11 The term 
has since evolved to characterize cyber-based activist efforts that may include protest “sit 
in” equivalents, such as denial of service attacks or website defacements, to more 
destructive hacking attacks against government or private computer networks. 
1. Cyber Threat 
Different threat actors with different intentions and capabilities challenge the 
cyber security environment on many fronts. Nation states and organized criminal groups 
represent the most sophisticated, persistent, and resourced of any advanced actors on the 
                                                 
10 Verizon, 2012 Data Breach Investigations Report, 2. 
11 Michelle Delio, “Hacktivism and How It Got Here,” Wired, July 14, 2004, 
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/news/2004/07/64193?currentPage=all 
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Internet capable of waging sustained efforts using a variety of sophisticated tools to 
achieve their goals.12 Despite demonstrating the capability and intent to persistently and 
effectively target the government and private sectors, hacktivists are perceived by some 
to be a limited threat whose actions are rather simple expressions of civil disobedience. 
Hacktivists linked to the collective group Anonymous went so far as to petition the U.S. 
government to decriminalize their denial of service attack methods and make them a legal 
form of protesting.13 
Illicit cyber activity is not unique to hacktivist actions and is also attributed to 
organized crime and nation states. Nation states engage in sophisticated Internet 
espionage efforts against foreign government and private sector entities. Similarly skilled 
techniques are used by a newer breed of organized criminals who use the Internet for 
illicit gains by targeting an ever-expanding victim set of individuals and private sector 
entities who rely on the Internet for business and commerce. Despite best efforts, many of 
these private sector entities are finding it increasingly difficult to defend against the 
sustained and skilled efforts of these online threat actors, otherwise known as an 
advanced persistent threat (APT).14 Since they are designed to break into networks and 
harvest valuable pieces of information over extended periods of time, APT attacks are 
purposeful and not random. APT attackers are either motivated by corporate espionage 
designed to steal valuable trade secrets and intellectual property, or to sabotage an 
organization’s plans and infrastructure. According to Symantec, the attackers leverage 
information from a variety of sources to carefully engineer their way into a system or 
network.15 This can be achieved through a number of tactics; however, the most common 
of which are social engineering tactics like spear phishing (an act of sending fraudulent 
                                                 
12 White House, Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (Washington, DC: Executive 
Office of the President, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/2011-strategy-
combat-transnational-organized-crime.pdf. 
13 The Current State of Cybercrime 2013: An Inside Look at the Changing Threat Landscape, EMC 
Corporation, 2013, http://www.emc.com/collateral/fraud-report/current-state-cybercrime-2013.pdf. 
14 Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) (Atlanta, GA: Damballa, 2010), 
https://www.damballa.com/downloads/r_pubs/advanced-persistent-threat.pdf. 




emails for the purpose of gaining unauthorized access into a system). Once inside, the 
attacker, intent on remaining undetected, uses sophisticated malware and anonymization 
tools to mask his or her actions and successfully exfiltrate or catalog data for future 
exploit.  
The rise of hacktivism is no accident. Technological advancements involving the 
Internet, such as social media, have provided a significant advantage for social activists 
to advance their cause and enables them to recruit large masses with little effort. This 
platform also provides the distinct advantage of anonymity, a luxury not previously 
enjoyed by leaders of traditional social movements. More concerning, however, is the 
increasing availability of malicious tools and malware that, if directed towards U.S. 
critical infrastructure, could potentially cause severe economic and physical harm to the 
homeland. 
2. Hacktivism 
Depending upon one’s lens, the term hacktivism can be defined from ethical acts 
of hacking to effect social change to outright cyber terrorism intent on massive 
disruption. Despite these differences, hacktivism can largely be termed an act of protest 
using the web-based tools to effect social or policy change or an elevation of civil 
disobedience into cyber space. The hacktivist, taking advantage of the cyber platform and 
web-based cyber weapons, formulates direct action potentially on a global scale. 
However, what makes hacktivism unique and different from APT and other cyber-based 
threats is also what makes it more challenging. Hacktivism, unlike the organized criminal 
group and nation state, is a leaderless phenomenon that has little accountability. This 
amorphous nature limits our ability to predict the trajectory of their actions since 
leaderless movements lack direction and discipline.16 The 2012 Verizon Data Breach 
Investigations Report as well as actions by hacktivist groups are suggestive of a possible 
evolution from peaceful online protests to aggression.17 In 2013, Anonymous secretly 
accessed U.S. government computers and stole sensitive information in a yearlong 
                                                 
16 Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place. 
17 Verizon, 2012 Data Breach Investigations Report. 
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campaign with yet to be determined consequences.18 The Russian nationalist group Nashi 
demonstrated the power of cyber attack as a political tool when the group crippled 
Estonia’s commerce through a series of Internet based denial of service attacks against 
Estonia’s banking and government infrastructure in 2007.19 Security experts, including 
the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), General Keith Alexander, are 
increasingly concerned about the emerging ability within the next year or two for 
hacktivist groups like Anonymous to bring about power outages and disable compute 
networks.20 
3. Splintering into Extremist Movements 
Due to the growing dependence and interconnectivity on the Internet, it is worth 
asking whether the growth of hacktivism equates to a growing threat or is quite possibly a 
benign “computer enabled assault on violence itself.”21 Thomas Rid, author of Cyber 
War Will Not Take Place, offers an opposing discussion that suggests social movements 
on the web are a preferable alternative to terrestrial-based movements since the web does 
not possess physical characteristics of violence. Historically, traditional social 
movements have revealed the potential for increasing violence. The civil rights 
movements and anti-Vietnam War protests of the 1960s are such examples of activist 
movements that quickly evolved into direct action networks, such as the Weathermen.22 
The moderate protest tactics of the environmental movement were continuously 
suppressed by authority, which led to more extreme members to leave Earth First! to 
form a more violent group. Such historical context suggests that social activist 
                                                 
18 “FBI Warns That Anonymous Has Hacked US Government Sites for a Year,” The Guardian. 
19 Noah Schachtman, “Kremlin Kids: We Launched the Estonian Cyber War,” Wired, March 11, 
2009, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/03/pro-kremlin-gro/; Ian Traynor, “Russia Accused of 
Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia,” The Guardians, May 16, 2007, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia. 
20 Siobhan Gorman, “U.S. Official Warns About ‘Anonymous’ Power Play,” Wall Street Journal, 
February 21, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles 
/SB10001424052970204059804577229390105521090. 
21 Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place, xiv. 
22 Ron Jacobs, The Way the Wind Blew: A History of the Weather Underground (London, United 
Kingdom: Verso Books, 1997).  
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movements, regardless of venue, possess the cognitive praxis to cause injury or harm in 
furtherance of a social cause. 
Hacktivist actions are learned in the social environment and through social 
interaction. As activist societies exist in complex social environments and adapt 
themselves to these environments, the hacktivist adapts within the virtual cyber 
environment. According to a recent report from EMC Corporation (EMC), hacktivists are 
finding business opportunities and supplemental revenue streams in the underground by 
selling their stolen information to profit driven criminals.23 With weaponized malware 
variants increasingly available to cybercriminals, does this new crossover collaboration 
push hacktivist actions further along the threat continuum?24  
America’s networks will continue to be challenged by new forms of hacking 
concurrent with challenges to the nation’s political structure. Academic analysis of the 
evolution of hacktivism is necessary to better understand the current and potential future 
threat to such systems posed by the increasingly skilled hacktivist. The cyber radical has 
many faces. Should the growth of this social movement lead us to caution and fear or, 
according to some, hope and exhilaration?25 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This review identifies relevant sources concerning hacktivism and the differing 
social opinions regarding the threat or lack of threat posed by hackers who use the 
Internet to effect social or political change. Since hacktivism is generally agreed to have 
emerged in the late 1980s, the scope of the literature review reaches back to its 
emergence in the late 1980, when hacktivism is generally agreed to have started. Within 
this review, numerous sources have been identified to support analysis and understanding 
of social movements, hacktivist actions, identity issues concerning hacktivist groups, and 
the threat or lack thereof posed by hacktivists. 
                                                 
23 The Current State of Cybercrime 2013: An Inside Look at the Changing Threat Landscape. 
24 Weaponized Malware: A Clear and Present Danger (WP-EN-09-12-12), Lumension, September 
2012, https://www.lumension.com/Media_Files/Documents/Marketing---Sales/Whitepapers/Weaponized-
Malware---A-Clear-and-Present-Danger.aspx.  
25 Kat Braybrooke, “Hacktivism Is Unbound,” Tumblr.com, http://hacktivism-is-
unbound.tumblr.com/. 
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Much has been written regarding hacktivism that recounts the first reported 
hacktivist protest in 1989 involving the release of the “WANK worm” into the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration’s computer network. This anti-nuclear protest 
called attention to the launch of a plutonium powered satellite and is one of many actions 
that continue to grow in sophistication and impact.26 According to NSA Director General 
Keith Alexander, hacktivist collectives such as Anonymous pose an increasing risk to our 
national security.27 Anonymous members immediately denied such accusations despite 
having threatened to take down the Internet only one week earlier. 
The literature review of hacktivism is broad and, for the purposes of this initial 
research, is separated into four categories. The first addresses the ethos of the hacktivist 
movement and whether such actions are in fact an ethical form of civil disobedience in a 
new social construct of reality. There is differing opinion on the value of the hacktivist 
action in regards to free speech. The second and third sections will address the discussion 
concerning hacktivist actions and tactics and whether these actions are effective in 
creating social or political change. The final section will address the discourse about 
whether hacktivism represents an emerging threat to the homeland. The research suggests 
divergent opinions on each of these issues. 
Since the first hacktivist action in 1989, the size of the Internet has exploded and 
with it the number and increasingly sophisticated forms of online protests and political 
activism. Forms of protest have varied to defacement of websites, to hacking of financial 
infrastructure to outright cyber warfare against countries like Georgia and Estonia. Yet, 
despite these actions, the research differs on whether hacktivist groups such as 
Anonymous truly are a threat or, as one researcher believes “not inherently dangerous” 
but rather “important tools for realizing social change.”28 
                                                 
26 Suelette Dreyfuss, Underground: Tales of Hacking, Madness, and Obsession on the Electronic 
Frontier (Sydney, Australia: Random House Australia 1997).  
27 Gorman, “U.S. Official Warns About ‘Anonymous’ Power Play.” 
28 Victoria McLaughlin, Anonymous: What Do We Have to Fear from Hacktivism, the Lulz, and the 
Hive Mind? (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia, 2012), https://pages.shanti.virginia.edu 
/Victoria_McLaughlin/files/2012/04/McLaughlin_PST_Thesis_2012.pdf, 81. 
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1. A New Social Reality? 
Hacktivism is a scaled form of political activism that includes modern forms of 
civil disobedience to more radical attacks against critical infrastructure. Eric Sterner 
further described the cyber protest movement as “American as apple pie” and stated that 
the ends fit well within American tradition.29 Such situations or events are perhaps 
conceptualized as “changing strategies of argumentation” utilizing new social tools and 
are, as theorized by Corbett in his individual research on reasoning, as antiquated as Plato 
and Aristotle.30 Social discourse has historically been accepted throughout the ages; yet, 
there are many examples of when such discourse pushed the boundaries of disagreement 
during the course of social argument and press upon the fringe of immediate recourse for 
change. The Earth Liberation Front (ELF), a radical environmental group, was formed by 
a group of frustrated British Earth First! members who were dissatisfied by the 
organization’s desire to abandon illegal tactics.31 In his analysis of ELF, Loadenthal 
surmised that Earth First!’s ideological underpinnings are based in “deep ecology, anti-
authoritarian anarchism highlighting a critique of capitalism, a commitment of non-
violence, a collective defense of the Earth.”32 The group has since evolved into the Earth 
Liberation Front and is more closely recognized as a collective of autonomous 
individuals who utilize illegal tactics, such as sabotage and vandalism, in furtherance of 
their ideological beliefs. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has classified ELF as a 
domestic terrorist group in 2001. Yet, despite this regulatory action, social movements as 
a form of resistance have continued to progress in many ways. David Heineman, in his 
thesis about digital rhetoric, succinctly equates hacktivist actions as forms of visual or 
                                                 
29 Eric Sterner, The Paradox of Cyber Protest (Arlington, VA: George C. Marshall Institute, 2012), 
http://marshall.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Paradox-PO-Apr-12.pdf, 1. 
30 P. J. Edward Corbett, “The Changing Strategies of Argumentation from Ancient to Modern Times,” 
in Practical Reasoning in Human Affairs: Studies in Honour of Chaim Perelman, ed. James L. Golden and 
Joseph J. Pilotta, 21–36. 1st ed. (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 1986). 
31 Paul Joosse, “Leaderless Resistance and Ideological Inclusion: The Case of the Earth Liberation 
Front,” Terrorism and Political Violence 19 (2007): 351–68. 
32 Michael Loadenthal, “The Earth Liberation Front: A Movement Analysis,” Radical Criminology, 
no. 2 (2013): 15.  
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ocular arguments evidenced by website defacements and message board discussions.33 
The terrestrial movement made cyber. 
If argumentation theory is valid, then to what end is the level of online discourse 
considered an acceptable reality? It is hard to argue that in the new age of social media, 
today’s generation is becoming increasingly adept at utilizing the Internet as a primary 
form of communication. In this context, personal communication as a form of face-to-
face interaction is clashing with the increasingly growing culture of online 
communication. In this backdrop, the hacktivist movement has gained strength and 
increased notoriety.  
As previously noted, General Alexander highlighted the U.S. government’s 
concern that Anonymous potentially represents an increased threat to our homeland 
security threat. In their widely accepted publication the Social Construction of Reality, 
Berger and Luckmann demonstrate that persons and groups through a period of 
interaction within a social system will begin to adopt or habitualize each other’s actions 
eventually institutionalizing these actions as the new norm.34 If accepted, then it can be 
said hacktivism is an expression of the new argumentation reality online. Sociologist 
Herbert Blumer views collective behavior as key towards breaking normal, 
institutionalized behavior thus positively contributing to society.35 The websites 
Reddit.com and Change.org are widely accepted social activist platforms for ideological 
discussion; however, why then do the hacktivist actions of Anonymous not receive 
similar acclaim or acceptance? If reality is socially constructed, then over time is it likely 
that hacktivist actions will also become more widely accepted or will they evolve into 
more similar movements such as ELF? 
The recent comments attributed to Director of the NSA, General Keith Alexander 
appear to suggest that the U.S. government does not share Blumer’s principle when it 
                                                 
33 David Scott Heineman, “The Digital Rhetorics of Hacktivism: Anti-Institutional Politics in 
Cyberspace” (master’s thesis, University of Iowa, 2007).  
34 Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the 
Sociology of Knowledge (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1967). 
35 Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison, Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach (University Park, 
PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991). 
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comes to the newly evolving phenomenon of hacktivism. General Alexander believes that 
the threat posed by protest groups of hacktivists are sources for considerable concern and 
suggests that in the very near future, such groups will have the ability to attack the 
electrical grid.36 The increased threat posed by Anonymous and the hacktivist collective 
is potentially supported by the increasing number of sophisticated attacks against U.S. 
government and corporate targets.37 As a newly evolving phenomenon, it is worthwhile 
to examine the identity of Anonymous and whether its acceptance or lack thereof is 
attributable to generational clash or nonconforming realties.  
2. The Hacktivist in Action 
Perhaps the most pertinent discussion concerning reality is that offered by Jean 
Baudrillard in his essay entitled “The Violence of the Image.” Baudrillard asserts that the 
act of becoming, that is, the environmentalist achieving all things green or the hacktivist 
realizing a world void of censorship, is an “image produced in real time” theoretically 
ending the period of becoming or action to achieve this goal.38 However, actuality “does 
not know anything but change, it does not know the concept of becoming.” Many groups 
have evolved or changed purpose for both good and nefarious cause. The March of 
Dimes, created to find a cure for polio, has since evolved its mission to increase 
awareness of a variety of health issues facing mothers and babies. Thus, according to 
Baudrillard, the change of purpose means the image can never be realized. What then of 
the hacktivist movement in the current context of the Internet? To what end will 
Anonymous go to achieve an ever-distant goal?  
In the processing of becoming, Samuel, in her thesis concerning hacktivism and 
the future of political participation, suggests that hacktivists, perhaps emboldened by the 
Internet’s perceived anonymity, is increasingly focused on the “right to be heard—rather 
                                                 
36 Gorman, “U.S. Official Warns About ‘Anonymous’ Power Play.” 
37 Verizon, 2013 Data Breach Investigations Report, Verizon Enterprise, 2013, 
http://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_data-breach-investigations-report-2013_en_xg.pdf. 
38 Jean Baudrillard, “The Violence of the Image,” European Graduate School, accessed January 7, 
2014, http://www.egs.edu/faculty/jean-baudrillard/articles/the-violence-of-the-image/. 
 11 
than the simpler right to speech itself” and is capable of more direct action.39 Under the 
guise of hacktivism, groups such as Anonymous appear to achieve legitimacy; however, 
it is under this guise that the potential may emerge for more sinister action. In 2011, 
Anonymous and its splinter group LulzSec engaged in an aggressive cyber campaign 
against numerous private and government sector entities. Sophisticated denial of service 
attacks and network hacks resulted in disruption of commerce and banking as well as the 
release of sensitive email information and credit card account numbers.40 
The narrative concerning the legitimacy of hacktivism is broad and ranges from 
message board banter towards, according to Sterner, cyber warfare like that experienced 
by the country of Georgia in 2008. Sterner suggests that the hacktivist movement creates 
a sense of insecurity that no longer draws attention to a cause but rather to the movement 
itself.41 The shift away from simply organizing or expressing opinions about an 
institution to outright cyber attacks is a potential reflection of the changing landscape in 
the hacktivist movement.  
3. An Identity Problem 
The Anonymous collective as a social movement, although powerful in the cyber 
arena, is not unlike other terrestrial social movements. Denning roughly describes the 
hacktivist movement as a leaderless resistance that typically operates without the 
constraints of command and control or official rules and procedures.42 Similar groups, 
such as ELF and the modern anarchist movement, have operated under these same 
environs with limited result yet continue to endure. 
                                                 
39 Alexandra Samuel, “Hacktivism and the Future of Political Participation” (master’s thesis, Harvard 
University, 2004), http://www.academia.edu/616169/Hacktivism_and_the_future 
_of_political_participation, 234. 
40 Quinn Norton, “2011: The Year Anonymous Took on Cops, Dictators and Existential Dread,” 
Wired, January 11, 2012, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/01/anonymous-dicators-existential-
dread/3/ 
41 Sterner, The Paradox of Cyber Protest. 
42 Dorothy E. Denning, “Cyber Conflict as an Emergent Social Phenomenon,” in Corporate Hacking 




The lack of structure to the hacktivist movement is the basis for its strength and 
potential for increasing dangerousness. The emergence of social media has enabled 
groups such as Anonymous to increase online support with some passive members 
willing to facilitate the distribution of automated software tools developed by the more 
active and skilled members of the group. According to Denning, the tools themselves 
give the group leaders the control over the conduct of attack.43 The growth of online 
forums has contributed to the growth of the hacktivist phenomenon and must be 
considered when evaluating the movement as an emerging threat to homeland security. 
Very simply, the online forum provides means for distributing cyber attack tool(s), 
communicating targets to attack, and the necessary coordination for success.44 However, 
the anonymity afforded by social media and other web-based tools obscures the true 
identity of the hacktivist movement. This problem of identity makes it difficult to pin 
down purpose or motivation prompting leading researcher Thomas Koenig to ask “is 
Anonymous more a subculture with a franchise name than a hacktivist-movement?”45 
Schwartz, Dunkel, and Waterman, in their article entitled “Terrorism: An Identity 
Theory Perspective,” discuss terrorism as a multifaceted problem that can be better 
understood when analyzed through the lens of identity theory.46 Strindberg provides 
further support in suggesting that social identity theory (SIT) provides a broad analytical 
framework for understanding groups in general thus possibly encompassing the hacktivist 
collectives Anonymous and LulzSec.47 Although hacktivist actions are not yet widely 
attributed as terrorism, SIT, and other identity theories may provide the necessary 
frameworks to evaluate hacktivist groups and similar structured movements. According 
to Strindberg, the SIT framework helps researchers to better understand general patterns 
                                                 
43 Dorothy E. Denning, “Activism, Hacktivism, and Cyberterrorism: The Internet as a Tool for 
Influencing Foreign Policy,” in Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, ed. 
John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, 239–288 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001). 
44 Ibid. 
45 Thomas Koenig, “Anonymous: Merely a Causal Consequence of Social Media?” Shabka, August 7, 
2013, http://www.shabka.org/2013/08/07/anonymous-consequence-of-social-media/. 
46 Seth Schwartz, Curtis Dunkel, and Alan Waterman, Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective, 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2008). 
47 Anders Strindberg, “Social Identity Theory and the Study of Terrorism,” unpublished, Naval 
Postgraduate School.  
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of behavior possibly alerting us to the socially conditioned traits and behaviors present in 
past and possibly future behaviors.48  
Halupka states that the issue of online activism can be identified on two main 
levels: individual/participant and collective/community, thus complicating the role of 
identity in the hacktivist movement.49 In addition, Halupka highlights the need for further 
identity analysis in attempting to understand the way Anonymous and similar groups will 
facilitate future political participation in their attempts to incite social reform. 
Gabriella Coleman, author of numerous publications concerning the group 
Anonymous, calls for a more critical engagement of protest politics online.50 According 
to Coleman, “We need to start asking more specific questions about why and when 
hackers embrace particular attitudes toward different kinds of laws, explore in greater 
detail what they are hoping to achieve, and take greater care in examining the 
consequences.”51  
4. Persistent Threat? 
As the private and government sectors continue to increase their online presence 
and dependence on the Internet, they will become increasingly vulnerable to the effects of 
cyber protests. Gunter Ollman, Vice President of Research for Damballa, suggests that 
the steady increase in the sophistication of hacker tools combined with the social network 
and the general availability of “military grade” cyber attack tools make it a “trivial task 
for protestors to launch crippling attacks from anywhere around the world.”52 This is 
supported by the Georgia Institute of Technology in its 2013 emerging cyber threats 
report that suggests that malware developers are experimenting with new ways to foil 
                                                 
48 Ibid. 
49 Max Halupka, “The Evolution of Anonymous as a Political Actor” (master’s thesis, Flinders 
University of South Australia, 2011). 
50 Gabriella Coleman, “Our Weirdness Is Free,” accessed January 8, 2014, 
http://canopycanopycanopy.com/issues/15/contents/our_weirdness_is_free. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Gunter Ollmann, The Opt-In Botnet Generation: Social Networks, Hacktivism and Centrally-
Controlled Protesting, Damballa, 2010, https://www.damballa.com/downloads/r_pubs/Opt-In_Botnets.pdf, 
1. 
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defensive measures against denials of service tactics and other favorite hacktivist 
tactics.53 As noted by the 2012 Verizon Data Breach Report, hacktivist continue to focus 
on the government and financial sectors.54 What is not entirely clear is the extent to 
which the government and private sectors have prepared to defend against hacktivist 
tactics. 
History is replete with examples of social movements such as the 1920s German 
Nazi Party and the civil rights and anti-Vietnam War movements of the 1960s that have 
fractured into more disruptive movements.55 Although literature concerning social 
movement theory provides context for these movements, little is offered as to why these 
movements fracture to form more disruptive, sometimes terroristic, groups. The 
environmental movement of the 1970s spawned more active groups, such as Greenpeace 
and Earth First!, each dissatisfied with perceived ineffectiveness of political advocacy 
and legislation concerning the environment.56 The manifestation of the environmental 
movement varied from country to country; however, the movement was and remains 
representative of a modern global movement. Despite its global presence, its large 
membership body has proved difficult to unite and thus susceptible to fracture. This is 
evidenced by the fractures that lead to the formation of more disruptive groups, such as 
ELF and the Animal Liberation Front. Causes for these fractures require further 
exploration and may signify the potential for similar activity in the global Anonymous 
collective.  
Unlike the stated agenda of the environmental movement, the literature provides 
little background on Anonymous as a social movement since its agenda is vague and 
abstract. In attempting to identify the increased disruptive potential for Anonymous and 
similar hacktivist collectives, it is worthwhile to examine Anonymous’s malleable agenda 
                                                 
53 Emerging Cyber Threats Report 2013, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2013, 
http://www.gtcybersecuritysummit.com/pdf/2013ThreatsReport.pdf. 
54 Verizon, 2012 Data Breach Investigations Report. 
55 Brian Ault, “Joining the Nazi Party before 1930: Material Interests or Identity Politics?,” Social 
Science History, 26, no. 2. (2002), 274, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/social_science_history/v026/26.2ault.pdf, 273–310. 
56 Roger Chapman, Culture Wars: An Encyclopedia of Issues, Viewpoints, and Voices (Armonk, New 
York: M.E. Sharpe 2009). 
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and determine whether this new social movement merits similar attention as previous 
global predecessors in the environmental movement. The recent actions of LulzSec, a 
smaller collective of Anonymous members incorporated from similar mimetic culture, 
conduced a multi-week “politically motivated ethical hacking” campaign against 
government and private sector networks in the name of Internet freedom and privacy.57 
Their efforts received global media attention as well as global attention from law 
enforcement who effectively dismantled the group. As a collective within Anonymous, 
LulzSec provides a unique opportunity to explore the praxis behind the Anonymous 
movement and whether the actions of LulzSec are representative of a more concerning 
move along the radical narrative. Additional academic research is required to more fully 
understand hacktivism as a new social movement and whether the cyber platform 
provides an increasing potential for more harmful disruptive actions like those briefly 
displayed by LulzSec. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
Research for this thesis will utilize qualitative case study analysis of activist 
movements and exploratory research to identify the vulnerabilities associated with 
increased Internet dependency. The assertion is that multiple case studies of historical 
activist movements compared to the current cyber activist movement will help identify 
causal factors for violence and how current activist movements may utilize the cyber 
venue to further their message. These methods were chosen because of the lack of 
academic research directly applicable to hacktivism as a social movement and the 
importance of cognitive praxis in identifying causal process in the activist movement. 
The assertion is that the study of activist movements in the terrestrial setting will provide 
a basis for better understanding the evolution potential for activism in the cyber domain. 
Case studies of the anti-Vietnam War movement and environmental movement will be 
compared with more recent actions involving cyber activists. 
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The evidence sought by use of these methods is to gain an objective 
understanding of how hacktivist movements may evolve within the context of terrestrial 
social movements. The anti-war movement of the 1960s and early 1970s provides a 
unique historical perspective for review in that a number of activist movements resulted 
in splinter groups that engaged in disruptive and violent activity against persons and 
property. Case studies of the Students for a Democratic Society, Earth First! and 
Anonymous will provide a strong model for understanding how small segments of 
society express displeasure with social environment and the progression of such 
movements towards violent or disruptive action. All three movements emerged from 
linear or decentralized networks that formed collectivist forms of organization. Strong 
internal organizations emerged that, when challenged, resulted in splinter formations. 
However, the period of sustainment for each group differs and thus provides unique 
perspectives on failure and success. Earth First! splintered into a domestic terrorist group 
called the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), and this provides a unique study that, on the 
surface, appears to exist and survive in anonymity very similar to the hacktivist collective 
Anonymous. Both Anonymous and ELF are amorphous blobs capable of self-
organization often triggered by random occurrences.  
It is also important to recognize the differences in activist organizations and 
identify common or unique elements that enabled such civil rights organizations, such as 
the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), to evolve into a revolutionary terrorist 
group known as the Weather Underground. The SDS, as a loose and non-hierarchical 
organization is very reflective of today’s hacktivist collectives and may potentially reveal 
characteristics consistent with transformation. The selection of these movements is 
relevant for understanding the cognitive praxis behind social movements and for further 
understanding causal factors for splintering and development of potentially more 
disruptive groups within hacktivist movements. The data from these studies will be used 
to compare and contrast contextual conditions associated with the Anonymous collective.  
It is difficult to formulate a true picture of hacktivism without considering the 
context from which previous social movements have evolved into direct action. Causal 
relationships and covariation will be loosely examined and compared to today’s current 
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online activist collective with an eye towards better understanding the capability and 
potential threat posed by the modern cyber movement. By examining the structural and 
communicative properties for each group, this thesis will attempt to identify specific 
triggers and behavioral patterns that potentially lead to violent or disruptive behavior. 
The cyber domain provides a unique opportunity for a small number of threat 
actors to project increased power. Thus, it can be surmised that the hacktivist, operating 
in the cyber environment, possesses the potential to cause serious disruption to 
government or private sector entities increasingly reliant on the Internet. To further 
examine this potential for harm, exploratory research will also be conducted to identify 
the vulnerabilities associated with increased dependence on the Internet and whether this 
potential wicked problem provides an adversarial advantage to the hacktivist. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This section introduces the structure of the thesis and, for each chapter, provides a 
short narrative concerning the focus and research to be addressed relative to the 
hypothesis. Each chapter was written to be largely self-contained and complete. To avoid 
excessive redundancy, lengthy information that is required in a later chapter of the thesis 
was occasionally referenced to an earlier chapter. 
Chapter II will provide an in depth understanding of how the Internet has evolved 
and whether the current state supports the premise that individuals or groups with 
nefarious intent can utilize the Internet as a platform for disruption. This chapter will 
further explore the evolution of the Internet and how its original design allowed the web 
to be unwittingly coopted by nefarious actors.  
Chapter III will examine the various type of threat actors on the Internet and the 
capabilities and motivations for each of these sources with specific detail given to the 
growing hacktivist threat group.  
Chapter IV will examine the ideological and cognitive effects that the Internet has 
on the congruence of hacktivists and social discourse by examining the social science of 
collective behavior and its effects on cohesion, discourse, and fracture. Further 
 18 
examination will be given to the Internet’s additive effect of anonymity on individual and 
collective behavior to further understand the possible impact of hacktivism. 
Chapter V will examine the origins and evolution of the 1960s student movement 
Students for a Democratic Society and the casual factors leading up to the formation of 
the violent splinter group called the Weather Underground. Analysis will focus on the 
impact of origin, structure, and communication on the decision-making process in the 
movement. 
Chapter VI will explore the emergence of the 1970s environmental movement and 
subsequent creation of the direct action group Earth First! The group’s structure and 
communication channels will be studied to possibly identify casual factors for the 
formation of more violent environmental groups such as the Earth Liberation Front. 
Chapter VII will review the evolution of Anonymous as a web-based social 
movement and identify unique and distinctive characteristics that enabled the formation 
of more disruptive hacktivist clusters, such as LulzSec. Previous analysis will be utilized 
to identify possible similarities or indicators for increased disruption by Anonymous or 
other hacktivist groups. 
Chapter VIII will identify key findings and effects that the Internet has on web-
based social movements. The final chapter will also highlight the importance of 
understanding the contributing factors for disruption and the potential future implications 








II. NATURE OF THE THREAT 
In order to realize the risk posed by web-based activists, it is first necessary to 
establish an understanding of how the Internet has evolved and whether the current state 
supports the premise that individuals or groups with nefarious intent can utilize the 
Internet as a platform for disruption. This chapter will further explore the evolution of the 
Internet and how its original design, though beneficial to its explosive growth, also 
allowed the web to be unwittingly coopted by nefarious actors. Once established, the 
chapter will examine how illicit appropriation of the web has heightened the nature of the 
threat posed by cyber dependency. Emphasis will be placed on the tools and malware 
commonly used by threat actors and how these tools are becoming increasingly available 
to amateur hackers and average citizens.  
A. GROWTH OF THE INTERNET 
The Internet has become an integral part of our existence in many parts of the 
world. Since the first email messages in 1970, the growth of the Internet has exploded 
and yet is considered to still be in its infancy. Today, cyberspace consists of millions of 
private, public, academic, government, military, and business networks. It connects 
everything from home computers and smartphones to government databases, 
telecommunication networks, and control systems used to operate the power grid.58 In 
essence, the Internet has become a “global commons”; it exists almost everywhere, open 
to anyone, allowing its inhabitants to move across it with ease and at ever-increasing 
speeds.59 However, America’s interconnectivity and interdependence on the Internet has 
become a wicked problem. According to Cisco, in 2008, the number of “things” 
                                                 
58 Howard A. Schmidt, “Cyber Threats and Cyber Doman: Implications of National Security,” 
Codenomicon, accessed July 17, 2014, 
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59 Issac R. Porche III, Jerry M. Sollinger, and Shawn McKay, A Cyberworm That Knows No 
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http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP342.pdf, 2. 
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connected to the Internet exceeded the number of people on earth and is projected to 
reach 50 billion by the year 2020.60  
In his 2013, paper about cyber security and critical infrastructure, Dave Clemente 
noted that cyberspace has become so deeply embedded into America’s sectors that it is 
indistinct amongst other critical infrastructure components such as energy, water, and 
communication. He describes cyberspace as a “thin layer or nervous system running 
through all other sectors, enabling them to function and interconnect.”61 However, 
America’s reliance upon this interconnectivity is also its Achilles heel and can be 
exploited by anyone with savvy technical capabilities and access to the web. In October 
2012, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta warned that threat actors have already gained 
access to some of America’s critical control systems that run chemical, electric, and 
water systems with the intent to “cause panic, destruction and loss of life.”62 According 
to MIT’s Technology Review, this threat scenario is plausible because of the outdated 
technology used to operate critical infrastructure and states that some of the software 
used to operate critical infrastructure has not been updated since its initiation.63  
Panetta’s comments are reflective of the actions of ideologically based hackers 
who utilize their skills and web-based tools for disruptive means in order to elevate 
attention to an issue or, in more limited circumstances, force policy change. The threat 
posed by hacktivists and other malicious actors on the web results from mainly three 
things: the ubiquity of Internet-connected devices, the global reliance on cyberspace, and 
the inadequacy of cyber security.64 The interconnectivity between the billions of “things” 
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suggests that even the slightest web disturbance can result in a cascading effects possibly 
resulting in a disproportionate threat or response. According to a recent report from 
McKinsey & Company, a global management consulting firm, “the global economy is 
still not sufficiently protected against cyber attacks—and it is getting worse” adding the 
“risk of cyber attacks could decelerate the pace of technology and business innovation 
with as much as $3 trillion in aggregate impact.”65 In March 2013, a simple targeted 
attack against the web servers of Spamhaus, an anti-spam company in the United 
Kingdom, resulted in a global ripple effect that slowed down or limited access to Internet 
sites and servers around the world.66 Very large attacks like this are easily accomplished 
and usually originate from a number of sources. This particular attack, called a 
distributed denial of service or “‘DDoS,’” directed Internet traffic to Internet address for 
Spamhaus’ web servers effectively creating a tidal wave that overwhelmed the network. 
Since Spamhaus was responsible for filtering email messages for nearly 80 percent of the 
Internet’s spam or junk mail messages, the DDoS attack had a significant effect on 
Internet traffic.67 The sources of attack traffic can be a group of individuals working 
together such as the hacktivist collective Anonymous or a smaller number of persons 
with access to a number of compromised computers. These techniques will be discussed 
later in this chapter. To understand how all this is possible, a closer examination of the 
cyber domain is warranted. 
B. ARCHITECTURE BY DESIGN 
America’s reliance on cyber networks stands in stark contrast to its lack of cyber 
security. Cyber networks, including those that comprise of critical infrastructure, contain 
vulnerabilities, which can be exploited to access critical information or to disrupt 
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operations.68 In response to a growing need to share research and communication 
between isolated computer nodes, the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) initiated a research program to investigate techniques and technologies for 
interlinking the isolated networks. By developing communication protocols 
(Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and Internet Protocol (IP)) for networked 
computers to talk with each other, DARPA developed a communication backbone today 
known as the Internet.69 This design embodied a key underlying technical idea, namely 
that of open architecture networking, an unsecure platform for continuous design 
innovation. Thus, as an open architecture, any network could be “selected freely by a 
provider and made to interwork with the other networks through a meta-level 
‘Internetworking Architecture.’”70 
Joseph Kizza, author of the book Computer Network Security and Cyber Ethics, 
describes an ill-conceived cyber infrastructure developed without a clear set of blueprints. 
Infrastructure growth was reactive in response to the changing needs of developing 
communications between computing elements.71 This “open architecture protocol” gave 
birth to the computer industry and the eventual rapid growth of the Internet. Much like 
the application or “apps” platform for smartphones, open protocol invites many 
architects, some of whom are interested in exploiting this architecture for a variety of less 
productive or nefarious reasons, including pranks, financial gain, and activism. 
According to Vinton Cerf, one of the “fathers of the Internet,” Internet protocols were 
published openly to be used without licensing or approval.72 Hoping to grow the Internet 
organically through independent communication, Cerf intended that new applications 
would be implemented without permission from Internet service providers. However, 
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open connectivity meant that “parts of the Internet could attack other parts” by infecting 
computers and network servers with malware and Botnets utilized to “generate spam, 
launch denial of service attacks and to conduct corporate and government espionage.”73 
Today the cyber domain operates in an atmosphere of trust that enables 
communications through a series of partially opened windows connected via a “three-
way handshake.”74 Computers exchange information via a formal handshake between 
clients and servers that, once established, leaves a small window open for continued 
information exchange or communication between the trusted partnerships. Hackers 
undermine this trust relationship and the open window by creating a three-way handshake 
that enables them to exploit this vulnerability. Thus, the Internet’s communication 
network becomes only as good as its “weakest hardware link and its poorest network 
protocol.”75 This ill-fated arrangement opens the cyber ecosystem up to a number of 
threats whose temporary fixes are a series of software patches that do not address the 
actual issue of the Internet’s original architecture design. 
C. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
As computer technology has advanced, U.S. critical infrastructures, such as 
energy, finance, and telecommunications, have increased their dependence on cyber 
systems to carry out operations and to process, maintain, and report essential 
information.76 Similarly, federal agencies and state and local governments increased their 
use of information and data systems also becoming entwined in the cyber ecosystem. The 
General Accountability Office (GAO), in recognition of this increased dependence on 
computer systems and the systems that support critical infrastructures, highlighted cyber 
critical infrastructure protection (CIP) as a continuing concern. Among the many risks to 
the cyber CIP, the GAO noted the ease of obtaining and using hacking tools, the steady 
                                                 
73 Ibid. 
74 Kizza, Computer Network Security and Cyber Ethics, 70. 
75 Ibid., 85. 
76 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Protecting the Federal Government’s Information Systems 
and Nation’s Cyber Critical Infrastructures, 2013, 
http://www.gao.gov/highrisk/protecting_the_federal_government_information_systems/why_did_study. 
 24 
advance in the sophistication of attack technology, and the emergence of new and more 
destructive attacks as high concern.77 
According to Deibert and Rohozinski, cybercriminals exploit the “relative 
anonymity offered by the Internet, as well as the absence of harmonized national laws 
defining cybercrime, to circumvent or avoid prosecution.”78 Traditional criminals look 
for low-hanging fruit or easy targets, much like the unattended home with the open front 
door. Today, because of the previously described architectural flaws, the global e-
economy, and jurisdictions with poorly functioning or nonexistent Internet laws, 
criminals have moved online out of the reach of authorities in jurisdictions where such 
activities are clearly criminalized.79 The discouraging result is that staying a step ahead 
of cybercriminals is much more difficult than staying ahead of the traditional criminal 
actor. 
However, as cybercriminals have become more adept at using the Internet for 
crime, so too have governments and law enforcement become more adept at detecting 
their activities. Those wishing to remain engaged in unlawful or subversive activities 
have been forced to develop new safe havens from which to continue their deeds. In 
addition to the criminals, the persistent plight of dissidents, such as the Nepalese bloggers 
who are being arrested by the government for “misuse of democratic freedoms to attack 
state interests” or civil suits against music file sharers have exacerbated the cry for 
Internet freedom and the right to anonymity.80  
Today, cybercriminals achieve anonymity via sophisticated encryption programs. 
To prevent unauthorized access to data or communication, software suites use 
sophisticated encryption algorithms. The software rearranges bits of data into complex 
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puzzles that requires a decryption keys to decipher. The private key (originator) and 
public key (authorized recipient) utilize an infinite number of alpha and numeric 
sequences to form an encryption chain that is extremely secure and resilient to even the 
most powerful computer processors.81 Various applications of this technique are 
available via the web, such as Pretty Good Privacy or PGP, which can be used to secure 
email, texts, files, and other forms of Internet communications.82 Encryption technologies 
continue to evolve and now use layers of encrypted chains each requiring authentication 
before allowing access to the next encrypted layer.  
One such commonly used and free encrypted layer program is known as Tor, 
short for The Onion Router. Tor enables online anonymity by directing Internet traffic 
through a global network of more than five thousand relays.83 Tor uses layers of servers 
to separate computer users from the websites they visit to hide a user’s location.84 This 
expansive network conceals a user’s location or usage from anyone conducting network 
surveillance or traffic analysis. Tor is intended to protect the personal privacy of users 
and their ability to conduct confidential business by keeping their Internet activities from 
being monitored. The National Security Agency characterized Tor as “the King of high 
secure, low latency Internet anonymity.”85 
D. MARKET FOR WEAPONS 
Though Tor and other encryption programs have many legitimate uses for 
business transactions and personal communications, these same technologies are being 
appropriated for illicit use. A 2014 RAND report on cybercrime revealed that online 
black markets are growing in size and complexity and can be more profitable than the 
                                                 
81 Jeff Tyson, “HowStuffWorks ‘Public Key Encryption,’” HowStuffWorks, accessed August 1, 2014, 
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/encryption3.htm. 
82 “Encryption Software,” Symantec, accessed August 1, 2014, http://www.symantec.com/products-
solutions/families/?fid=encryption. 
83 “TorStatus—Tor Network Status,” accessed July 17, 2014, http://torstatus.blutmagie.de/. 
84 Jonathan D. Glater, “Privacy for People Who Don’t Show Their Navels,” New York Times, January 
25, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/25/technology/techspecial2/25privacy.html?_r=0. 
85 “Tor: ‘The King of High-Secure, Low-Latency Anonymity,’” The Guardian, October 4, 2013, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/tor-high-secure-Internet-anonymity. 
 26 
illegal drug trade.86 This is suggestive of the increasing number of cyber threat actors 
gaining access to sophisticated cyber weapons and “poses a formidable challenge and an 
increasing threat to businesses, governments, and individuals operating on the digital 
world.”87 The flourishing black market offers the ability for threat actors to buy or rent 
cyber tools that can penetrate just about any computer system in use today, as well as the 
infrastructure to carry out even large-scale operations.88 Most concerning in RAND’s 
assessment is that “almost any computer-literate person” can gain access to the cyber 
black markets and its catalog of tools and malware. Internet sites such as YouTube and 
Google provide easy access to a number of videos describing how to use hacker toolkits 
to break into websites or steal bank account login credentials.89 The popularity of these 
so-called black markets has enabled “anybody to buy a gun” elevating concern for 
security experts.90 
A diverse number of malicious products and services can be found on the web. A 
review of security data reveals the following most commonly acquired techniques 
utilized to conduct cyber attacks: viruses, worms, and denial of service attacks. 
E. COMPUTER VIRUSES/WORMS 
Computer viruses refer to usually small pieces of software that attach themselves 
to email or other files that, when open, enable access into an unwitting computer system 
or network. The replicating nature of viruses enable them to quickly create harm to the 
infected system by either corrupting the affected drive or gaining access to protected 
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information. Properly engineered viruses can have devastating effects usually resulting in 
loss of productivity. 
In August 2012, the Saudi Arabian Oil Company, also known as Saudi Aramco, 
was targeted by a group of hackers that managed to infect approximately 30,000 
workstation computers operating within the company’s network.91 Utilizing a virus 
designed to erase or wipe data from Saudi Aramco’s affected network hard drives, the 
hacker(s) intended to disrupt the company’s crude and oil gas supplies “potentially 
causing devastating effects to the global market.”92 Based in Saudi Arabia, Saudi Aramco 
is the world’s largest oil and gas producer and one the world’s most valuable companies 
with an estimated worth of $10 trillion.93 Yet despite its worth and value as a critical 
infrastructure component, Saudi Aramco was still victimized by a group of “skillful 
amateurs” who deployed a self-replicating computer virus available via the Internet.94 An 
“anti-oppression hacker group” named Cutting Sword of Justice claimed responsibility 
for the attack stating they were “fed up of crimes and atrocities taking place in various 
countries around the world.”95 The virus was used to propagate a political message and 
its effects on Saudi Aramco’s network were felt for more than two months. The Saudi 
Aramco attack is regarded as one of the most destructive acts of computer sabotage on a 
company to date.96 
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Worms are similar to a virus; however, worms are standalone software and do not 
require a host program or human help to propagate.97 Computer worms have the 
capability to replicate and travel quickly throughout the Internet with potentially 
devastating effects. The replicating worm often overwhelms the affected system causing 
it to stop responding to web traffic or shut down. The famous Code Red worm swept 
across computers worldwide in 2001 by exploiting a flaw in one of Microsoft’s web 
servers successfully bringing down a number of private and government websites to 
include the whitehouse.gov site.98  However, the famous Stuxnet worm is perhaps the 
most alarming and most ominous sign of the increasing sophistication and dangerousness 
of cyber based weapons.  
The Stuxnet worm was a zero-day exploit designed to target vulnerabilities in 
software that have not yet been discovered by their manufacturers enabling the worm to 
activate at a designated time and date.99 Hackers exploit these vulnerabilities or “holes” 
before a vendor is aware of the issue and fixes the problem. The subsequent attack is 
known as a zero-day attack and can include infiltrating malware, spyware, or allowing 
unwanted access to user information.100 Stuxnet, believed to be a covert effort by one or 
more nation states, was inserted into Iran’s industrial control systems for its nuclear 
enrichment program via an identified vulnerability in the Microsoft Windows software 
used to operate the system’s hardware.101 Once activated, the worm collected information 
about the operation of the industrial systems and prompted the fast-spinning centrifuges 
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to tear themselves apart.102 By targeting industrial control systems, Stuxnet became the 
first computer virus to be able to wreak havoc in the physical world.103  
As is the problem with most malware, once deployed, Stuxnet quickly became 
available to anyone on the web creating a possible proliferation problem that will make it 
easier for terrorist organizations and other politically motivated actors to develop such 
capabilities in the future.104 According to Eric Rosenbach, the U.S. deputy assistant 
secretary of defense for cyber policy, the growing black market for malware, specifically 
zero-day vulnerabilities, is allowing almost anyone to buy the means to launch 
destructive cyber-attacks to include against U.S. industrial control systems.105 
F. DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE  
Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) have been utilized by hackers for decades 
and are a principal tool in the hacktivist toolkit. The first well-known DDoS attack 
occurred against the University of Minnesota in August 1999.106 This two-day attack 
involved flooding servers with data packets originating from over 1,000 compromised 
computers. The computers were used at different times to attack a single server at the 
University of Minnesota resulting in denied access to a very large university network.107  
Since this initial attack, DDoS attacks have become more sophisticated and have 
evolved to include a number of distinct characteristics that include flood attacks, mail 
bombing, permanent denial-of-service attacks, and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) 
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attacks. In the case of a denial of service attack, the attacker installs software onto 
unwitting computer for the purpose of co-opting the computer to be employed as one of 
many “zombie” computers in future network attacks. The owner of the coopted computer 
is usually unaware of this compromise.108 Once an army of zombie computers has been 
employed, the attacker sends a series of large data packets to a targeted computer system 
or network. The targeted system becomes overwhelmed and either reboots itself, thus 
taking it offline, or unable to receive legitimate information requests.109 The attacker, in 
using a series of compromised and usually unwitting computers, has not only formed a 
small army of attack computers but has also derived the benefit of anonymity making it 
difficult to identify the source of the attack. (See Appendix)  
This use of intermediary computers presents a two-fold problem. Intermediaries 
make attribution difficult since the zombie computers effectively shield the identity of the 
attacker. Second, by using intermediaries, hackers can form an army of zombie 
computers, otherwise known as botnets, to create a large-scale attack with little or no 
effort.110 
In 2007, Russian hacktivists conducted a sophisticated DDoS attack against the 
country of Estonia as part of a protest action against the country’s decision to relocate a 
bronze statue that honored Russia’s deceased World War II veterans. Cognizant of 
Estonia’s heavy reliance on the Internet and online services, hackers conducted a virtual 
invasion of Estonia via a series of DDoS attacks against Estonian banking and 
government sector networks. These attacks lasted for a period of approximately three 
weeks, effectively disrupting banking and government communication. According to the 
New York Times, hacktivists flooded Estonian networks with a data load equivalent of the 
entire Windows XP operating system every six seconds for 10 hours.111 Hannabank, 
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Estonia’s largest bank and one of the prime targets of the attack, lost revenue in excess of 
one million dollars due to disrupted credit card and automatic teller machine 
transactions.112 The parliamentary email server and the IT capabilities of several 
government ministries were disabled, paralyzing the state’s ability to effectively respond. 
Howard Schmidt, the White House cyber-security czar, acknowledged the seriousness of 
these attacks stating that the high tech nation of Estonia had “basically been brought to 
their knees.”113 Although no critical infrastructure was permanently disabled during the 
attack, the events “consumed the affairs of an entire government and drew the attention 
of the world.”114 
Today, a sophisticated DDoS tool known as the Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) 
has become a favorite of the hacktivist group Anonymous. The tool, originally created to 
perform witting stress tests of computer networks, and now readily available via the web, 
has been altered to enable a limited number of hacktivists to direct and control the 
attack.115 By enabling a programmed option called the “Hive Mind,” members wittingly 
and sometimes unwittingly enable their computer to be used to attack any target. 
Anonymous has also altered this program to be utilized via select Twitter accounts 
eliminating the extra step of downloading the tool to a computer.116 By clicking on a link 
on Twitter, users submit enable their computer to be used for targeted DDoS attacks. Use 
of such tools is a crime punishable by law in the United States and other western 
nations.117  
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The Internet is just one of many technologies hijacked for nefarious purposes. 
Zyklon B, a chemical originally designed as pesticide and disinfectant was notoriously 
utilized to kill scores of innocents in the Nazi death camps during World War II. Albert 
Noble invented dynamite to assist with mining and building thus making the expansion 
rail in the U.S. more efficient. Noble’s invention has since been used as a weapon of war 
and terror and famously used to kill 38 people on Wall Street in 1920.118 More recently, 
three-dimensional printing technology has been used to create both medical implants and 
untraceable firearms. Cyber attacks are continuing examples of the misuse of tools for 
nefarious purposes. The faulty infrastructure of the Internet is compounded by the now 
almost immediate availability of sophisticated cyber weapons that, with the right 
motivation, could cause significant harm to America’s critical infrastructure. It is often 
stated that the cyber threat is overblown and is part of a new industrial complex; 
however, the few examples discussed in this chapter are testimonial to the real and 
significant threat lurking in the cyber domain. Recognizing this potential, the National 
Intelligence Council issued a report in 2004 that noted “today individual PC users have 
more capability at their fingertips than NASA had with the computers used in its first 
moon launches.”119 With little investment, and the proper motivation, a threat actor could 
purchase the hardware and software necessary to disrupt critical U.S. infrastructure. 
However, weapons are not born of themselves; they require a person or persons to 
contrive of their use. The next chapter will identify the types of threats actors found on 
the web and delve further into specific hacktivist profiles. 
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III. THREAT ACTORS 
The concern regarding the proliferation of cyber-based weapons is equally 
matched by the proliferation of threat actors willing to use these weapons. Motivations 
behind such uses are many and are reflected in the number of daily cyber-based threats 
that confront the U.S. each day. These threats consist of both targeted and untargeted 
attacks from a variety of threat actors, such as criminal groups, terrorists, and 
hacktivists.120 The sources of these threats vary in terms of the capabilities of the actors, 
their willingness to act, and their motives, which can include financial gain or, in the case 
of terrorism and hacktivism, political influence through disruption. To accomplish these 
goals, threat actors utilize a number of effective cyber based tools and techniques that are 
readily available via the web. Emboldened by the anonymity of the Internet, attackers 
utilize social media and secure communication platforms to access likeminded folks with 
a variety of skillsets. Hackers are often motivated, in part, by their invisibleness; 
however, their true motivations can be varied and complex.121 This chapter will examine 
the various type of threat actors on the Internet and the capabilities and motivations for 
each of these sources with specific detail given to the growing hacktivist threat group.  
A. CRIMINAL HACKERS 
Hackers enjoy the thrill of being able to peek into company servers and seek 
restricted information about a company or government agency. Although these hackers 
may lack malicious intent, at least initially, their actions are undoubtedly criminal. The 
lack of criminal intent also does not lessen the dangerousness of their actions, rather, it 
distinguishes them from a more sophisticated network of criminal hackers motivated by 
financial gain. In fact, the thrill seeking hacker is often glorified as one who is providing 
a greater good by exposing security flaws in networked systems. This is not unusual and 
consistent with hacker discourse that suggests exposing the naked emperor is a public 
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service and consistent with hacker ethos. Such actions have given birth to the term 
“ethical hacker” and are used to justify what is otherwise a criminal act. Much like the 
activist hacker, so-called ethical hackers engage in criminal acts to further a personal 
agenda. Some, termed “white hats,” penetrate computer systems to raise awareness of 
systems flaws allowing the system owners to repair the holes before a malicious attack 
takes place.122 
Not everyone is aligned with the concept of “ethical” hacking since the actions of 
these alleged whistleblowers are often illegal. Perhaps the biggest and most infamous 
example of this divergence is represented by the actions of Edward Snowden, a NSA 
contractor who singlehandedly exposed some of the country’s most sensitive intelligence 
programs to the world. Disenchanted with the extent of the U.S. government’s extensive 
meta data collection and surveillance efforts, one he termed “intent on making every 
conversation and every form of behavior in the world known to them.” Snowden, an 
experienced information technology (IT) security specialist, accepted an assignment to an 
NSA post in Hawaii with the intention of exposing the agency’s top secret surveillance 
programs.123 A hacker of a different sort, Snowden, using his “authority” as an IT 
security specialist, convinced fellow NSA co-workers to provide him with their closely 
held passwords thus falling victim to a commonly used hacker technique called social 
engineering.124 Over the next few weeks, Snowden proceeded to download thousands of 
classified documents containing information on the surveillance programs of the U.S., the 
United Kingdom, and other countries involved in joint surveillance operations. Using 
PGP encryption tools, Snowden contacted a number of world media outlets and activist 
groups and provided them with thousands of the classified documents causing 
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tremendous harm to the U.S. government’s national security programs.125 In a recent 
ruling concerning metadata collection of telephone records, a federal court ruled that the 
NSA program was “almost certainly unconstitutional.”126 Snowden claims to be a patriot 
who upheld his oath to defend the U.S. Constitution, a constitution he claims was being 
violated on a massive scale by the U.S. government.127 The New York Times went so far 
as to call him a patriotic whistle-blower who has done a great service to the country.128 
Others see Snowden as a traitor who may have caused irreparable harm to U.S. 
national security and suggest that the damage done to national security does not justify 
his actions.129 Regardless of one’s position, Snowden, using his hacking skills and the 
power of the Internet, effectively elevated awareness of a significant national program 
and caused U.S. policymakers to reexamine the extent of the U.S. government’s metadata 
collection and surveillance programs. 
Unlike Snowden, other criminal hackers are motivated by the prospect of a big 
payday. As discussed in the previous chapter, many cyber criminals have adapted their 
methods and are increasingly using cyberspace to gain monetizable information and 
exploit our nation’s financial payment systems to engage in fraud and illicit activities. 
The widely reported payment card data breaches of Target, Niemen Marcus, White 
Lodging, and other retailers are just recent examples of this trend.130 
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The low risk, high reward environment on the web has made it an attractive 
environment for various types of criminal groups. According to Dr. Tatiana Tropina, 
Senior Researcher at the Cybercrime Institute in Cologne, Germany, organized criminal 
groups are attracted to the web because of the “the easiness of communication, 
anonymity, and the accessibility of tools for illegal operations.”131 High consequence 
cyber crimes are not accomplished by isolated individuals; rather it is typically a 
transnational network of criminal associates, each with their own specialized role, 
engaging in a multi-national conspiracy to obtain valuable information, monetize this 
information through fraud and other illicit activities, and launder their criminal proceeds. 
These associates are organized within “multi-skilled, multifaceted virtual criminal 
networks centered on online meetings.”132 Much like other online collectives, such as 
Anonymous, the criminal networks rarely meet each other in person but rather organize 
and conspire in virtual chat rooms or message boards created solely for the purpose of 
exchanging and selling stolen goods or data on the web. Leading members of the group 
divide the criminal actors into different segments that are reflective of the member’s 
skillset: hackers, money launderers, malware developers, resellers, etc., usually all 
unknown to each other. These actors are joined together to carry out lucrative criminal 
acts. 
In 2004, one such group called Shadowcrew evolved into a successful 
international organization of over 4,000 members skilled in hacking, identity theft, data 
exfiltration, and the fencing of ill-gotten wares on the web. Primarily focused on hacking 
financial institutions for financial data, such as credit card and bank account information, 
members of the group skilled in hacking and exfiltration would post account information 
on the group’s message boards for further distribution to paying customers or group 
members willing to replicate the accounts for retail purchases and money withdrawals. 
Skilled money launderers transfer the ill-gotten proceeds into personal bank accounts, 
with everyone involved in the operation receiving a percentage of the proceeds. After 
                                                 




obtaining the cooperation of one of the group’s members, the U.S. Secret Service 
disrupted the criminal network and indicted over two dozen members of the group for 
criminal activity associated with their operation. It is estimated that in less than two 
years, the group stole over 1.7 million credit cards for a profit of more than $ 4 
million.133 
Using similar structure and tactics, a group of cyber thieves joined forces for a 
series of operations dubbed “Unlimited Operation.” During a two-year period from 2012–
2013, organized hackers gained access to a number of credit card processors that enabled 
them to not only steal prepaid credit card data but also manipulate the servers to eliminate 
the withdrawal limits on the accounts. Once inside, the group obtained the support of 
small cells of street runners or cashers from around the world, who after receiving the 
counterfeited credit and debit cards associated with the breach, withdraw an unlimited 
amount funds from automated teller machines around the world. In less than two years, 
the group conducted tens of thousands of transactions for a profit of more than $40 
million.134 The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York attributed the 
success of these attacks to the group’s speed and meticulous planning, surgical precision, 
and the global nature of the cybercrime organization.135  
According to Verizon, 75 percent of all data breaches in 2012 were motivated by 
financial gain making criminal hacking activity the most predominate form of illicit 
activity on the web.136 In 2013, criminal hackers breached Target’s payment system 
stealing payment information for approximately 70 million of its customers resulting in a 
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46 percent reduction in its fourth quarter profit alone.137 Experts believe Target will 
ultimately lose between $100–250 million as a result of this one breach.138 Such costs do 
not address the requisite legal fees and damage control costs to protect its brand. Web 
based anonymity combined with difficult transnational enforcement efforts will continue 
to benefit financially motivated cyber criminals. 
B. NATION STATE/ADVANCED PERSISTENT THREAT 
Nation states conduct cyber hacking activity to engage in information-gathering 
and espionage activities.139 These acts of espionage are necessary to further develop 
offensive plans for sabotage in times of conflict. According to Wilshusen, persistent state 
use of cyber tactics against the United States enhances the warfare doctrines for nation 
perpetrators who are otherwise powerless against the U.S. military.140 According to a 
report by the GAO, such capabilities enable a single entity to have a significant and 
serious impact by disrupting critical U.S. infrastructure and networks that support 
military power.141 
Nations, such as China, also utilize cyber tools to steal valuable trade secrets, 
intellectual property data, and confidential business strategies of U.S. based companies. 
Such acts by China and other state actors drain America of its competitive advantage and, 
according to some experts, have resulted in the largest ever involuntary transfer of 
wealth.142 During a 2012 congressional hearing on cyber security, Congressman Michael 
McCaul stated that America is under attack by “digital bombs” and publicly 
acknowledged a committee report that found China had stolen “several terabytes of data 
related to design and electronics systems of the F-35 Lightning II, one of the most 
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advanced fighter planes under development.”143 At a cost of over $400 billion, the F-35 
Lightning II is considered to be one of America’s most costly weapons program; yet, the 
design and production edge for this important national defense tool has been already 
compromised providing America’s competing national powers a substantial advantage in 
implementing their own national defense strategies.144 
Nations states also use cyber power as a useful strategic instrument since it can be 
wielded globally with a certain degree of anonymity in peace, crisis, and war.145 When 
used to attack critical systems, such as national infrastructure, the use of cyber power can 
potentially blur the distinction between peace and war resulting in increased risk to 
national security.146 These risks were demonstrated in the 2007 Estonia cyber attack. The 
Estonia attacks were largely attributed to patriot hackers motivated to support a Russian 
nationalist protest against the movement of a Soviet era memorial from Tallinn. 
However, the Estonian government believes these hackers acted under the direction of 
the Russian government serving as a buffer between the true intentions of the Russian 
government and the so-called autonomous hacktivist community.147 However, the 
sophistication of encryption and anonymizer tools available on the web makes it 
increasingly difficult to attribute such actions. Governments, taking advantage of these 
tools, may utilize hacktivists, patriot hackers, and organized criminal groups to conceal 
state sponsored activity and create campaigns of disruption built upon contagion within 
these groups. These blurred lines of distinction highlight the danger of anonymity and 
activism when nation states also have a general interest in a movement’s outcome. Others 
believe nation state activity on the web is reflective of change in the “character of war” 
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and the new norm in international politics. If true, then nation state cyber activity can be 
perceived as “a kind of background noise to the everyday dynamics of international 
relations” and the beginning of the age of perpetual disruption.148 
Such cyber activity can create serious national security concerns causing some 
countries to calculate their engagement in this area. Recognizing the escalation in nation 
state cyber activity and the problem of attribution, the U.S. and Russia agreed in 2013 to 
implement a nuclear hotline for communication during times of cyber crisis.149 
According to the Washington Times, this was done to prevent “errors in judgment or 
misunderstanding that could escalate into war.”150 
C. HACKTIVISM 
The term hacktivism has many derivations; however, it is mostly used to describe 
hacking activity in support of a social movement or cause. Nadav Morag, Professor and 
PhD at the Naval Postgraduate School, defines a hacktivist as “an individual who uses 
computers and computer networks to disrupt operations and/or expose sensitive 
information for political or social reasons.”151 Dorothy Denning, also at NPS, describes 
hacktivism as the elevation of civil disobedience into cyberspace; activism meets the 
hacker.152 In a sense, the term hacktivism is used to define a political movement that uses 
the Internet for direct action tactics to cause or influence political change. Much like the 
Greenpeace activists who confront whaling ships in the high seas, hacktivists confront the 
target of their protests on the Internet, taking advantage of the world’s increased reliance 
on the web for daily operations.  
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Others define hacktivism in less sinister tones. Peter Krapp suggests that 
hacktivism is a controversial term and points out that many are willing to equate 
hacktivists as programmers with critical thinking skills interested in expressive politics, 
free speech, human rights, or information ethics.153 Denning adds to this debate and 
offers that some see hacktivism as “conceptual net art that empowers people through 
active/artistic expression.”154 Acknowledging the ambiguity surrounding its definition, 
Krapp also suggests, “No common goal or motivating movement allows us to understand 
hacktivism in its social or political context.”155 Despite these differing variables, 
hacktivists use basic methods similar to that of other cyber criminals to achieve their 
goals. As we will explore in the next chapter, hacktivists are opportunistic and have 
numbers on their side. However, unlike cyber criminals, hacktivists much like the nation 
state actors in Estonia, aim to “maximize disruption and embarrassment to their 
victims.”156 
Hacktivists, whose origins date back to the 1980s, have access to and utilize a 
number of tools and techniques to elevate awareness of a social cause. In 1987, a German 
hacker group called BayerischerHackPost (BHP) attempted to attack German government 
computer systems that stored census information “in the belief that the government 
should not collect personal information.”157 In 1989 and in support of protest against the 
launch of the U.S. Galileo satellite powered by plutonium, unknown hackers deployed a 
worm to deface the Department of Energy and NASA websites with an anti-nuclear 
message for peace.158 
Though then appearing as little more than a nuisance, the actions of BHP and the 
deployment of the WANK worm reflected a change in the landscape for political 
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discourse and highlighted the power of the Internet as a tool for social change. Since this 
attack in 1989, hacktivists have utilized a number of tactics to promote political causes, 
chiefly free speech, human rights, and information ethics.159 Unfortunately, the WANK 
attack has not been the norm and set the stage for a significant evolution of activism on 
the web. In June 1998 members of the hacktivist group Milw0rm, a unique group united 
only by the Internet, seized control of six servers at India’s Bhabha Atomic research 
center in Bombay and downloaded thousands of pages of email messages and research 
that contained analysis and discussion of India’s nuclear testing and test detonations.160 A 
year later in 1999, the hacktivist group Electrohippies, in support of the massive street 
protests against the Seattle World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference, conducted 
a denial of service attack against server networks that supported the meetings effectively 
slowing down and completely halting the conference networks.161 The hacktivist group 
claimed to have effectively utilized 450,000 people to conduct their attack reflecting 
massive solidarity with the protest movement. The act also demonstrated an effective and 
significant relationship between hackers and the then nascent anti-globalization 
movement. The protests very effectively drew attention to the anti-globalization 
movement and supporting arguments. Though many consider such criminal acts a 
“nuisance,” hacktivists believe they are acts of civil disobedience and treasured 
expressions of free speech to promote social change. 
Hacktivism itself comprises of many sub-groups that, although linked by their 
desire for social or political change, are motivated by different factors. According to 
McAfee, hacktivism combines three major groups as follows:162  
1. Anonymous, an infamous social movement component that is actively 
involved in hacking, DDoS, and stealing and distributing personal and/or 
confidential information. 
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2. Cyber dissidents, considered by McAfee to be “the real activists” who 
primarily use the Internet and social networks for coordination to spread 
propaganda and information. They attempt high high-profile actions on the 
Internet in hopes of bolstering democracy and fighting corruption in their 
countries.  
3. Cyber warriors are described as patriotic hackers who “claim to act on 
behalf of their governments by supporting national and extremist 
movements.”163 Numerous politically charged skirmishes and government 
actions throughout the world provide motivation for turning hackers into 
hacktivists.  
Although not mentioned in the McAfee report, a real-world component also exists 
to compliment the hacktivist effort. Websites, such as WikiLeaks and the now defunct 
Exposed.su, have been set up to provide secure and anonymous ways for sources to leak 
personal information and sensitive documents for global public consumption.164 
Although not personally involved in the hack, such sites offer real opportunity for 
hacktivists to expose their targets reaching millions of people in the process. 
Anonymous and likeminded hacktivist groups will be further discussed in 
subsequent chapters; however, its avenging role against commercial, private and 
government sector entities has greatly increased forcing Verizon to declare 2011 as the 
year of the hacktivist. In 2011, despite accounting for only three percent of the data 
breach activity, hacktivists, and in particular Anonymous and its subgroups, accounted 
for the theft of an astonishing 100 million of the 177 million individual records stolen 
throughout the year.165 These statistics do not include the normal hacktivist activity, such 
as DDoS and website defacement, but rather, a graduating tactic with significant 
consequence. In 2011, Anonymous and its sub-group LulzSec targeted Sony to avenge 
what the group declared an “unforgivable offence against free speech and Internet 
freedom.”166 In response to Sony’s efforts to seek prosecution against a hacker who 
circumnavigated the security systems of Sony PlayStation 3, Anonymous and affiliated 
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hackers targeted Sony’s online gaming servers compromising 12 million financial 
account records for Sony’s online user community.167 Sony suffered total revenue loss of 
approximately $123 million as a result of the intrusion.168 This hack also revealed the 
indiscriminate nature of hacktivist attacks and also the potential for splinter groups within 
organizations such as Anonymous. The Anonymous sub-group LulzSec, largely believed 
to be behind the Sony attack, also went on an anti-government campaign that targeted a 
number of government websites and the sensitive data on its servers. The aggressive 
nature of their actions is potentially indicative of the willingness of a smaller sub-group 
to act out in undisciplined ways on the web.  
Although the nature of the cyber threat may vary, cyber threat actors utilize 
similar tactics and methods to accomplish their goals. Advanced persistent threats such as 
nation state cyber activity reflect the most sophisticated and perpetual cyber threats; 
however, the life cycle for criminal and hacktivist threats appears to be limited only by 
motivation and not their skillset; the previously noted availability of malware, toolkits 
and underground networks supports this.  
D. CONCLUSION 
However, what the methods do not imply is their motives. In order to understand 
the potential increased risk posed by hacktivists, it is necessary to further explore the 
actions of Anonymous and its subgroups compared to similarly motivated terrestrial 
based groups. If Anonymous and likeminded hacktivist groups are truly motivated by 
social dynamics and ideology, it is possible that continued evolution of such movements 
would entail use of increasingly disruptive cyber based tactics. As previously discussed, 
such cyber-based threats are real, accessible and capable of causing physical harm to U.S. 
infrastructure. This level of disruption, though not yet realized in the U.S., can have 
significant cascading effects that may potentially include harm or death to persons. The 
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previous two chapters have revealed the difficulty in not only identifying cyber based 
threat actors but in also containing the effects of their actions. Unlike a bomb or bullet 













THIS PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 47 
IV. RISKY SHIFT 
The individual threat posed by cyber threat actors is genuine as evidenced by the 
relative ease with which lone subjects can obtain and use cyber based tools and weapons. 
However, in attempting to further understand the potential threat posed by hacktivism, 
consideration must also be given to the Internet’s ability to serve as an enabler for social 
movements to splinter into more radical factions. In the 1960s and 1970s, the university 
campus served as a platform for communication and quick assembly resulting in a 
number of civil rights and anti-war movements around the United States. Campus sit-ins 
and clashes with authority distinguished their movement and memorialized their cause; 
however, more radical members employed terrorist tactics and formed direct action 
groups. This is evidenced by the social movement called the Students for a Democratic 
Society, who after repeated confrontations with authority, failed to galvanize its members 
beyond its broad based agenda. The resulting discourse forced more radical members to 
splinter and create a violent group known as the Weather Underground. Such discourse is 
not unusual for terrestrial-based movements as evidenced by the number of social 
movements and terrorist groups around the world. However, the recent explosion of 
social media and other web-based communication platforms offers a unique opportunity 
for social movements and discourse to evolve online. This chapter will further explore the 
ideological and cognitive effects that the Internet and social media has on the congruence 
of hacktivists and social discourse by examining the social science of collective behavior 
and its effects on cohesion, discourse, and fracture. Additionally, since the Internet 
provides the technical advantage of concealment, the effects of anonymity on individual 
and collective behavior will be further examined to further comprehend the possible 
impact of hacktivism. 
A. COMMUNICATIVE AND COLLECTIVE IMPACT OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
The emergence of social media and message boards on the Internet has resulted in 
increased communication, networking, and increasing reliance on digital infrastructure 
that can “empower transnational resistance movements and create new vulnerabilities for 
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nation-states.”169 Social media and other mass communication platforms enable quick 
congruence on hot topic issues creating a shared identity for once thought to be 
innocuous issues. This shared identity, as realized in Estonia and in the support of the 
revolutionaries of the Arab Spring, “demonstrated an international solidarity that 
structured itself without any hierarchy” and reveals the power of digital technology and 
its ability to rapidly mobilize groups of people in times of crisis.170 As noted by Jornod 
Rodhlann and as seen in the Industrial Revolution, “technological progress has stimulated 
societal transformations and whipped up revolutionary sentiment.”171 
When one considers the growth of social media and inherent ability for increased 
situational awareness, it is difficult to argue against the impact of this technology. 
Eliminating the challenge of time and space, social media connects people from all over 
the world together, creating increased opportunities for political awareness and 
organization. The Ukrainian Orange Revolution in 2004 is a real example of the impact 
of this technology. Citizens of Ukraine, upset with the results of a presidential election 
largely marred by the corrupt tactics of intimidation by the incumbent’s regime, 
conducted a series of protest actions that included acts of civil disobedience and general 
strikes. Taking advantage of the structural weakness within the incumbent regime, 
protesters circumvented authoritative efforts to squash their protest through effective use 
of the Internet and its web based communication tools.172 Citizen journalists offered their 
dissenting opinions on web-based message boards circumventing the government’s self-
censored media environment. Protesters also used mobile phones and the Internet to 
coordinate a wide range of activities, including election monitoring and wide-scale 
protests. With growing national unrest and increasing international attention, the 
incumbent leader was forced to hold a runoff election resulting in the regime’s demise 
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and a victory for the opposition and the Ukrainian protestors.173 In his paper regarding 
the role of digital technology in the revolution, Joshua Goldstein states, “the Orange 
Revolution would not have happened without the Internet”174 
Today, supported in part by over one billion registered smart cell phones, the 
Internet is accessible to almost anyone with electricity and the access to the web.175 At 
the end of 2013, the number of active worldwide social media users totaled 
approximately 1.73 billion equating to one quarter of the world’s population.176 During 
the five-year period leading up to 2013, social media was credited for the “first social 
media President,” the Arab Spring and the Occupy Wall Street movement.177 Social 
media enables millions of people to communicate at a moments notice, not only 
increasing political awareness, but also providing an organizing platform for activism. 
According to a 2009 digital activism survey, the “prominence of social networks as the 
‘gateway drug’ of digital activism is noteworthy” and was noted as the most common 
“first tool” for activists.178 This is unsurprising since the accessibility of the web and its 
Internet based tools are user friendly and, as previously noted, incredibly adept at 
formulating direct action. 
However, despite this “gateway,” some believe that activism, and in particular 
student activism is indolent. During the height of the Occupy Movement in 2011, a 
survey of professors at Brown University revealed that a majority of the faculty members 
believed that student activism is lower today than when they themselves attended 
college.179 According to the survey, of the faculty who have worked at Brown for more 
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than 20 years, 82.6 percent reported student activism is lower or much lower.180 The 
survey reveals an interesting perspective on activism and supporting social movements. 
The social movements of the 1960s and 1970s occupied physical space and were tangible 
for professors and authority alike. Racial segregation, the Vietnam War, and women’s 
rights issues helped to fuel nationwide campus protests. A galvanized student population 
solidified the existence of the Students for a Democratic Society as the leading student 
group against the war in Vietnam. Campus sit-ins and clashes with authority 
distinguished their movement and memorialized their cause, however, more radical 
members employed terrorist tactics and formed direct action groups like the Weather 
Underground and Earth Liberation Front. It would seem then, that the opaque agenda of 
the Occupy Movement, though effective at drawing attention to globalization theory, at 
least from the viewpoint of the Brown professors, was not unifying and void of the 
flashpoints associated with previous student movements. 
Lauren Schleimer, columnist for the Brown Daily Herald, disagrees stating, 
“students just don’t protest like they used to.”181 Reinforcing the Internet’s role in 
activism, Schleimer notes that the Internet and social media have made it easier to 
organize a popular uprising and points to the Arab Spring as an example.182 In December 
2010, a Facebook video of a Tunisian fruit vendor setting himself ablaze to protest the 
corrupt tactics of the Tunisian government served as the tipping point for a series of 
rebellious protests by Tunisians exasperated by years of high unemployment and limited 
personal and political freedoms.183 The actions of the protesters also galvanized the 
support of hacktivists around the globe, who showing solidarity with the movement, 
disabled several Tunisian government sites and provided Tunisian protestors with tools to 
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avoid government detection on the Internet.184 Hacktivists redeployed dialup modem 
pools to establish communication channels to aid and guide protest movements 
strengthening the protestors’ resilience against government forces.185 
The lens used to view activism can affect how one views the impact of a social 
movement. The university professor reflects upon galvanizing issues of the 1960s and 
recounts how such movements shaped discourse in America. Others argue that activism 
is alive and well and has actually moved beyond terrestrial into cyber.186 Tunisia and the 
Orange Revolution are real examples of how hacktivists, taking advantage of public 
sentiment and structural vulnerabilities within a government, can leverage the power of 
the Internet to strengthen movements. Though only a small part of the overall movement, 
hacktivists have effectively displayed their ability and willingness to engage in powerful 
protest actions. It would then appear that digital activism is lesser understood for its 
impact and is misunderstood in the context of larger movements. Activists today freely 
exchange ideas in open forums gaining access to millions of people in the process. By 
connecting individuals to broad social movements, social media brings individual micro 
thought to a macro level where it can be harnessed by the masses. Occasionally, from 
these debates emerge movements, such as Occupy and the Arab Spring, two movements 
considered significant for its social impact and ability to garner mass media attention. By 
sustaining discrete communication platforms for use by Middle East protestors, 
hacktivists played a small part in sustaining protest efforts. It is in this context that the 
power of the Internet and hacktivism may be greatly underestimated. 
B. STRUCTURE 
The strength of a group is determined by its organizational structure.187 Social 
movements traditionally have had many organizationally distinct components that 
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“change through fission, fusion and new creation.”188 These components are sometimes 
purposeful for command and control and others a result of splinters or defined roles and 
responsibilities, such as those within cyber-criminal organizations. Larger collectives like 
the SDS, a student body movement, also had many campus chapters influenced by 
various ideologies and beliefs resulting in subgroups of Marxist, Socialist, Maoist, and 
worker’s rights alliances within the larger anti-Vietnam War collective. As an Internet-
based collective, hacktivists rely on collective action for target selection and action since 
most members are joined virtually via the web from around the globe. In these 
movements organizational structures and processes are an “action form” or “method of 
protest in itself” rather than a means for resource mobilization.189 Thus, the action is the 
cause that sets the movement in motion. 
What motivates the action, especially in reform movements, is what also defines 
its structure. Since the 1960s, social movements in America have attempted to work 
within the established order and preserve some existing values, such as equal opportunity, 
preservation of the environment, or as is the case with most hacktivists, freedom of 
speech. The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s was not subversive but rather worked to 
change socio-economic conditions within the existing social and governmental 
frameworks. In order to achieve such goals, movements require the development of at 
least ephemeral organizational structure to overcome the challenges of resource 
mobilization and funding. However, hierarchy and structure are often the qualities of 
government that social movements are trying to change thus are “counterproductive to 
the group’s ideals.”190 In his thesis, about the evolution of Anonymous, Max Halupka 
states that the restriction of hierarchical structure causes political movements to 
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disengage and seek alternative forms of governance.191 The result is often a leaderless 
decentralized network that effectively embraces the collective.   
Decentralized networks consist mainly of nodes or cells that although part of a 
larger collective, are usually not beholden to any single point of control. The ideology or 
purpose determines its actions. Each node possesses a certain amount of autonomy; 
however, is expected to act in accordance with the group’s goals. Alignment with the 
group’s goals is achieved through communication platforms, such as publications, 
journals or, as in the case of hacktivism, web-based communication platforms. Discourse 
between nodes or with the larger network can lead to schism resulting in one or more 
nodes either dissolving or splintering to form a separate group.  
A secondary characteristic of decentralized networks in virtual environments is 
the ability for these networks to swarm around a particular issue or cause. Swarms are 
informal partnerships that are created spontaneously by people who share common 
interest or ideologies without leadership.192 Collaboration is a byproduct of the swarm 
and not the cause of it. However, swarms are always collaborative as members are 
motivated by being part of the larger group. As a virtual entity, “trust is assessed via 
reputation in online illicit activities.”193 Anonymous, as a reactive body, is reflective of a 
swarm group that, as a result of web based communication platforms, is highly responsive to 
emerging issues. (See Figure 1). 
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Figure 1.  Model of Swarm Style of Convergence194 
Activists favor decentralized networks because its structure makes “insurgency 
and infiltration difficult” allowing even more extreme elements to remain resilient against 
authoritative action.195 Radical environmentalist movements utilize decentralized 
networks to effectively implement tactics of direct action. Likewise for the SDS, who 
after attempting to use a structured environment, fell into a more linear network of 
campus chapters, each with individual leaders galvanized behind an anti-capitalist 
agenda. As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, hacktivists, in particular the group 
Anonymous, utilize decentralized networks to perform target selection and direct action 
via web based communication platforms.  
C. FRAMING THE DISCOURSE 
Activist use of the Internet to communicate and organize is greatly enhanced by 
the web’s “distributed architecture and its scale-free topology.”196 Social media provides 
a unifying framework for the emergence of cooperation and formation of scale free 
networks. Community blogs like Facebook were unwittingly designed to enable 
collective action. Likeminded individuals are drawn to similar interests on the web 
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through hubs like Facebook and Twitter creating additional dialogue and smaller 
communities on the web. Joss Hands, author of the book @ is for Activism, refers to these 
“bonds of recognition” as impacting not only what people may agree about but also their 
differences.197 According to Hands, when we put “distributed networks together, 
opportunities to engage in dialogue, to come to agreement and act necessarily scale 
up.”198 The Internet exponentially increases the likelihood of finding likeminded partners 
thus provides a distinct advantage over terrestrial based movements.  
In addition to convergence, social media also provides a unique platform for 
individuals to frame the debate. This framing process, first coined by Erving Goffman in 
1974, highlights the evolutionary manner where communicators, over a period of 
discussion and debate, construct a point of view that others embrace for a particular 
situation.199 The result is a central organizing idea that galvanizes larger numbers via 
social media platforms. 
Framing is often applied to social movements and is helpful to describe the effects 
social media has in framing hacktivist movements, such as Anonymous.200 Felix Tusa, 
author of the article “Identity in Flux: Social Media and Social Movements,” attests that 
the Internet and social media have “reinvented the process of framing,” adding the 
Internet is a perfect tool to give context and meaning to occurrences.201 Much like the 
major news networks, social media offers the ability for protestors to share information, 
video, and photos about an issue enabling the individual and larger group to frame an 
issue over time. Incorporating this power, Anonymous, showing solidarity with a 
Canadian-based activist magazine’s call to “occupy Wall Street,” posted a YouTube 
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video in August 2011 drawing attention to the little known article.202 The video 
announced plans to mobilize 20,000 people to lower Manhattan, which resulted in 
massive national media attention and security alerts from the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS).203 The end result was a multi-month assembly of over 700 people in 
lower Manhattan that drew intense media attention to the group’s cause of social 
inequality. Hacktivist DDoS efforts to disrupt Wall Street operations were mostly 
ineffective; however, their involvement and support effectively focused global attention 
on the cause of social inequality. The Occupy Wall Street movement was greatly 
enhanced by the use of social media tools enabling a few protestors to galvanize massive 
virtual support for their cause.204 The popular social media site Facebook has since 
become a recruiting tool for new supporters and event coordination.205 
The recent emergences of web-based technologies have converged to provide a 
unique backdrop for social movements and, unlike the inherent difficulties in sustaining 
terrestrial movements, enhances resiliency for amorphous movements. Williams suggests 
that the Internet has replaced the traditional need for money and labor and is equally as 
important as “legitimacy, manpower, and technical expertise” in emulating the social 
movements of the 1960s.206  
Much like terrestrial social movements, online activist communities also disagree 
resulting in the creation of smaller autonomous hubs or clusters that are less controlled by 
the larger majority. Hacktivists occupy this small cluster environment. Alexandra Samuel 
asserts that the hacktivist hub or collective actually represents a new social movement 
                                                 
202 Sean Captain, “The Real Role of Anonymous in Occupy Wall Street,” Fast Company, October 18, 
2011, http://www.fastcompany.com/1788397/real-role-anonymous-occupy-wall-street. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Andrew Fleming, “Adbusters Sparks Wall Street Protest,” Vancouver Courier, September 27, 
2011, http://www.vancourier.com/news/adbusters-sparks-wall-street-protest-1.374299. 
205 Neal Caren and Sarah Gaby, “Occupy Online: Facebook and the Spread of Occupy Wall Street,” 
October 24, 2011, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1943168. 




within the aforementioned larger collective.207 According to Samuel, hacktivists 
represents an “unconventional collective behavior” with their own common discourse.208 
Thus, as actors in the in the larger collective, the hacktivist framing process can focus 
direction and action to resolve collective action dilemmas by “technically enabling new 
one person forms of action.”209 This is an important distinction as it not only denotes a 
stronger appreciation of the role and threat posed by hacktivists but also the autonomous 
nature of their decision making process. 
Gladwell strengthens this argument and suggests, when it comes to online 
activism, decisions made by consensus very rarely create strong ties or bonds for 
effective change.210 Although this structure creates group resilience in low-risk 
situations, change is rarely a by-product of low-risk movements. Hacktivism, as a direct 
action equivalent, represent a necessary risk-reward equivalent for social movements. 
Apryl Williams, Graduate Assistant at the Sociology Department of Texas A&M, 
suggests that although collective identity serves as a counterpart to individual identity 
management, “the sentiments that are projected on social media don’t always translate to 
meaningful action.”211 This argument supports the opinion of the professors at Brown 
University and questions the limits of hacktivism and the factors and channels of protest 
that are required for meaningful action. The anti-war movement of the 1960s comprised 
of many individuals easily identifiable by authority yet the movement persisted and 
evolved into direct action, as evidenced by the Weather Underground. In their book Poor 
People’s Movements, Piven and Cloward contend that change results from chaos and 
disruption and famously proposed overloading the American welfare system to force a 
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new system that would guarantee equal income for Americans.212 The effectiveness of 
this strategy and the use of disruption continues to be challenged by many social 
scientists who argue that disruption inhibits success as evidenced by the violent strikes 
held by labor unions in the 1900s.213 Though challenged, the Piven-Cloward strategy of 
disruption remains a viable tactic in social movement and terrorist methodology. 
As previously noted, groups formed by weak ties are less likely to achieve change 
against formative structures such as governments. However, the process of group 
polarization suggests that groups tend to make more extreme decisions through a process 
of de-individuation, or loss of individual self-awareness. The remaining group is less 
cautious and more likely to engage in risky behavior, a process also termed as risky 
shift.214 This shift is significant since, as previously noted, the Internet provides a real 
platform for disruption. Hacktivist groups such as Anonymous engage in disruptive 
behavior in furtherance of a social cause and appear to be an online equivalent for risky 
shift. Anonymous represents a more extreme option for lesser capable or committed 
members, in this case, an online collective. 
Hacktivists then are a cognitive layer within the larger discourse. As an 
amorphous blob, decisions are made across a single parallel and not subjected to 
hierarchy or hegemonic authority. This is purposeful as transgressors “seek ways to free 
human individuality from the bonds of representation that would contain it.”215 For 
example, the SDS failed to coalesce a lasting movement beyond the campus; thus, the 
Weather Underground used transgressive performances in the service of hegemonic 
discipline.216 Hacktivists attempt to move social movements beyond the rhetoric towards 
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action and recognize that the representative debate process “dilutes the potential effects 
of concrete action” necessitating a distinct and separate hacktivist cluster or 
movement.217 Samuel highlights this inevitable outcome and describes hacktivist groups 
as a “self-defined, discursive, unconventional collective action movement.”218 They are 
mostly void of purpose but rather a method looking for a cause akin to a bomb maker in 
search of a terror group. Their technical capability distinguishes them as a means based 
movement in search for “specific purposes or political issues that can serve as targets for 
their hacktivist practices.”219  
The lack of hierarchy or control in decentralized networks such as Anonymous, 
although, beneficial to resiliency and communication, also opens the network to a larger 
collection of ideas, which, as discussed, leads to discourse and tension. Thus, the 
conditions that create decentralized movements are sometimes subject to debate and, 
although not harmful to the majority, may isolate cells and/or clusters within the group. 
In general, most social movements focused on policy or institutional change 
embrace “polite” protest tactics “aimed more at attracting media attention and influencing 
public opinion than using disruption as a tactic of last resort.”220 However, according to 
Hank Johnston, author of the book States and Social Movements, although highly 
organized, these less effective tactics tend to isolate those cells or clusters holding more 
extreme ideological stances.221 Radical members of the environmental group Earth First!, 
frustrated with the group’s unwillingness to escalate its use of direct action, splintered to 
form a more extreme group called the Earth Liberation Front that, remaining aligned with 
the cause of environmentalism, utilized more damaging tactics of arson and property 
destruction. Johnston notes that the failure to sustain even the extreme movement results 
in some members becoming more isolated and, unwilling to compromise.222 This results 
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in the creation of persistent fringe elements within moderate groups. Considerable risk 
can emerge when the radical group persists and obtains a sense of legitimacy from more 
reasonable moderate members.  
In addition to ideological differences, groups can experience fracture when 
members or cells take initiative to further the cause sensing personal power as a result of 
their skill and/or abilities. A 2005 letter from al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri 
criticized then leader of al-Qaida’s network in Iraq Abu Musab al-Zarqawi for his 
abhorrent tactics of hostage beheadings and increased conflict with Shi’a Muslims rather 
than remain focused on al-Qaida’s strategy of engagement with the U.S. military.223 The 
letter revealed that al-Zarqawi acted independently and did not accept direction from al-
Qaida leadership; however, the success of al-Zarqawi’s network in Iraq forced an uneasy 
alliance with al-Qaida leadership who could no longer deny his influence and 
following.224 Al-Zarqawi felt it necessary to take initiative in achieving the movement’s 
goal in Iraq thus did not seek or wait for permission.  
According to Luther Gerlach, most division occurs during the growth phase of a 
movement and contributes to its expansion.225 Decentralized groups make decisions 
through consensus; however, as previously noted, these decisions can also be influenced 
by stronger personalities. The division that results tends to create new radical groups that 
are more likely to reject authority and organization.    
D. ANONYMITY 
One of the more forceful and concerning consequences of collective behavior is 
the dominating effects that the collective can have on individual behavior. According to 
social psychologists, individuals, when acting within a group setting, are susceptible to 
deindividuation or a loss of self-awareness. According to Jenna Chang of Baylor 
University, deindividuation theory asserts that the effect anonymity has on producing 
                                                 
223 David Ensor, “Al Qaeda Letter Called ‘Chilling,’” CNN, October 12, 2005, 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/10/11/alqaeda.letter/. 
224 Lee Hudson Teslik, “Profile: Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 8, 
2006, http://www.cfr.org/iraq/profile-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/p9866. 
225 Gerlach, “The Structure of Social Components.” 
 61 
uninhibited behavior is dependent upon group size; “the larger the size of the group, the 
higher the degree of anonymity experienced by the group’s members.”226 This 
immediately highlights the risks associated to online collectives since social media 
provides a unique platform for larges masses to gather anonymously. The previously 
discussed influence of groupthink combined with the risks associated to anonymity make 
online collective more susceptible to antisocial behavior. As cited by Chang, when using 
the Internet, people who used computer mediated communication and whose identities 
were unknown showed a greater tendency to exchange “flaming behavior,” such as 
hostile and threatening messages etc.227 The i-SAFE foundation, a non-profit Internet 
safety organization, supports this claim as statistics revealed that “over half of 
adolescents and teens have been bullied online” with more than one in three young 
people have experienced cyber threats online.228 
Distinguished psychologist Philip Zimbardo submits that when acting in an 
anonymity-conferring environment, a person will increase aggression such that he will 
feel the pleasure in destruction, vandalism and, the power of being in control.229 
Anonymity also effectively diminishes concern for self-evaluation resulting in personal 
disregard for following societal norms of behavior.230 Thus, behind the mask, people are 
more likely to regress and when influenced by others in similar circumstances and engage 
in more risky or aggressive behavior. This social phenomenon is not unique or isolated to 
a particular venue or setting but rather inherent in the social construct of the individual 
mind. As a collective born of the Internet, hacktivists have already gained the distinct 
advantage of anonymity as evidenced by previously described anonymizer tools, such as 
Tor; the effects of collective behavior serves to exacerbate the risk of aggression.  
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In another study, group interactions between people who believed they were 
communicating anonymously were six times more likely to make uninhibited remarks 
than those who believed they could be identified.231 As social media enables more people 
to participate in discussion, the anonymity of these platforms undoubtedly increases the 
level of discourse. However, the global nature of social media and the Internet entails that 
web-based discussions are marked by the distance between the participants. According to 
Wallace, it is easier to attack someone if they are out of sight and far away as it removes 
the expression of fear or anguish while simultaneously providing safety and immunity 
from reprisal.232 
Anonymity also offers the positive benefit of self-disclosure, a desirable feature 
present in many support groups, such as Alcoholics Anonymous. A treasured commodity 
for discourse in the political process, anonymity protects participation in the political 
process as evidenced by the democratic voting processes.233 websites like change.org 
enable users to digitally sign petitions for organizations and causes they are passionate 
about. Confidential participation allows users to freely express their personally held 
beliefs without fear of reprisal, embarrassment, or shame.234 People are free to speak 
their conscious.235 
However, the impact of anonymity on behavior is arguably supplanted by the 
tactical advantage it provides to the adversary. According to Lieutenant Colonel (Lt. 
Col.) Iverson, anonymity affects the strategies of denial and deterrence because both 
assume that the potential opponent and his capabilities are known.236 The proliferation of 
technology such as weaponized malware exacerbates the issue since hacktivists gain both 
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the capability for disruption without the possibility of detection. This is concerning since 
the motivation for attack increases with the decreasing ability for detection; “Instead of a 
rich vs. poor discriminator, technology may make an individual’s anonymity a 
determining factor in his calculus to carry out an attack.”237  
Samuel states that hacktivists use anonymity as shelter from legal consequences 
such that it gives them the freedom to “mock perceived hegemonies and to release 
‘incorrect’ but genuine feelings.”238 Thus, the choice of anonymity and accountability is 
a matter of “risk tolerance;” the hacktivist engaged in illegal actions will take great 
measures to conceal his/her identity, while lesser skilled or gullible hacktivists will 
accept a degree of risk because of their greater trust in the network. This is evidenced by 
the safety in numbers offered by the size and scope of the Anonymous collective. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Understanding how discourse is transformed into action is critical when 
attempting to understand the impact of structure and technology on activism. It is 
apparent that the communicative advantages of the web have eliminated the need for 
money and resource, which enables social movement to quickly evolve online. However, 
the decentralized architecture of the Internet has also introduced scores of people to 
decentralized networks that utilize discourse and the web for action. The structure of such 
groupings effects the actions of its members sometimes to the detriment of the collective 
cause. The additive effect of anonymity creates a risky shift that, at times, impacts the 
direction and action of a group. The deteriorating effect of this behavior in a leaderless 
network results in aggressive action that when challenged, increases friction between 
members. Thus, the tangible benefit of situational awareness and discourse that social 
media provides to the global collective ironically offers complexity behavior issues for 
web-based activism. More radical members are forced to consider the issue of whether 
the idealized individual ideas or projections offered by the majority actually contribute to 
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collective solutions to social issues?239 The potential result is the existence of more cells 
or clusters within the group that, depending upon the conviction or level of influence of 
its members, may occupy more or less isolated positions within the overall network.240 
This overlapping introduces a number of changes to the network that overtime can evolve 
into more radical clusters of likeminded people offering skilled hacktivists with necessary 
conviction the perfect environment for disruption. If, as Gladwell suggests, change is a 
by-product of high-risk, then hacktivists may be the one component of a social movement 
that can achieve such ends.  
Such grass roots movements exists both virtually and in the physical world and 
will be further studied to understand the impact of collectivist forms of organizations and 
the disruptive potential for web-based activists. The following three chapters will include 
the case studies of the Students for a Democratic Society in America, Earth First!, and 
Anonymous. All three movements emerged from linear or decentralized networks that 
formed collectivist forms of organization. Strong internal organizations emerged that 
when challenged, resulted in splinter formations.    
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V. STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 
This chapter will detail the evolution of the 1960s social movement Students for a 
Democratic Society (SDS) and the discourse surrounding its splintering and ultimate 
creation of the domestic terrorist group the Weather Underground. SDS represents a 
significant social movement period for the United States and utilized the campus venue to 
incite political discourse about U.S. policy on a number of issues, including the Cold 
War, racial inequality, and Vietnam. In order to theorize about the potential security 
threat posed by hacktivist groups and web-based social movements and the potential 
metamorphosis of those groups into security threats, it is important to recognize the 
differences in activist organizations and the common or unique elements that enabled 
such civil rights organizations as SDS to evolve into a revolutionary terrorist group 
known as the Weather Underground. The SDS, as a loose and non-hierarchical 
organization is very reflective of today’s hacktivist collectives and may potentially reveal 
characteristics consistent with transformation.   
A. VENUE AS ORIGIN 
In the early 1960s, a political movement emerged advancing a radically new 
critique of capitalism and the U.S. Cold War policy of nuclear deterrence and resulted not 
only in a shift in philosophical outlook but also in language and collective practice. The 
economic boom of the 1950s, although significant for the growth of Middle America, 
also isolated an impoverished and less influential minority segment of America. The 
poverty of the north and the segregation issues of the south influenced a civil rights 
movement that increasingly received attention from a minority number of students in 
prominent college and university campuses. Concurrent with the black lead civil rights 
movement, activists believed the anti-communist McCarthy era highlighted U.S. policy 
to rid the nation of communism in order to sustain a capitalist agenda seen as supporting 
a white elite. The anti-communist rhetoric also provided the U.S. government the 
rationale for nuclear armament that in the eyes of the student body increased the potential 
for conflict as evidenced by the Cuban missile crisis. Opposed to the centralized and 
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authoritarian politics of the Cold War, a loose collection of liberal, radical, and Marxist 
thinkers coalesced to form an American version of the New Left, a term already used to 
describe younger aged reformists in the United Kingdom and western Europe.241 
Members of the New Left believed that mainstream politics was dominated an elite who 
“preferred a docile public to an engaged one.”242 
The SDS emerged from a worker rights movement in 1960 when University of 
Michigan students, Alan Haber, Tom Hayden, and others who disenchanted by the 
narrow labor platform and lack of activism in America formed the SDS to highlight 
social and racial inequality in America. Shortly thereafter in 1962, SDS President Alan 
Haber conducted the group’s first national convention in Port Huron, Michigan, where 
Tom Hayden released the group’s first manifesto known as the Port Huron Statement.243 
Calling for a participatory democracy with decentralized decision making, the manifesto 
highlighted a number of issues to include racial and economic inequality in the United 
States, the Cold War tension, and threat of nuclear war. The document also highlighted 
its first call to action calling for a change in the political system based on non-violent 
civil disobedience. The statement’s weaker stance against communism also served to 
isolate it from the workers party since SDS now viewed the Cold War and racism as their 
core issues.  
Purposely intending the group to be an open society, as evidenced by its broad 
agenda enabled by participatory democracy, SDS leadership embraced the student body 
and campus venue for its inherent social reach and symbolism as a body for democracy. 
The campus venue also bridged the gap of funding and resource, a necessary component 
for the sustenance of any social movement.  
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By espousing a campus movement, SDS disregarded a formal hierarchical system 
for a more autonomous base evolved from campus SDS chapters throughout the 
country.244 However, for Haber, Hayden, and others, expansion would come at a cost to 
its hierarchical and national leadership since this broad approach to activism continuously 
threatened the ideological scope and purpose of the movement. This is a natural tendency 
for social movements since most movements do not necessarily possess authoritative 
leaders but rather leaders who, through the power of influence, control direction, and 
messaging for the movement.245 
However, influential chapter presidents continuously exposed SDS’s broad 
agenda to discourse effectively, which weaken the group’s national leadership. The 
national office, attempting to appease the increased influence and power of the growing 
chapters, organized yearly SDS conventions where new national leaders would be 
elected. These conventions, consistent with its participatory model, were wrought with 
discourse about how to further its anti-imperialist agenda thus precluded any sort of 
successful decision making. The “work with all” approach failed to identify a true 
purpose other than to challenge the morality of the American system. Instead, SDS 
represented a “combination of ideas that challenged the existing social system.”246 This is 
significant since lack of ideology or purpose enables a number of influential members to 
swing or shift group agenda and thought towards different goals often resulting in 
sustained group discourse. In essence, SDS was a rather loosely drawn organization with 
relatively limited objectives. This broad agenda, although useful for increasing group 
membership, did not necessarily provide a strong core or anti-establishment argument 
and would ultimately serve as its biggest structural flaw. 
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C. DISCOURSE 
Attempting to put “theory into action,” SDS members formed a community 
outreach program called the Economic Research and Action Project to show solidarity 
with poor, mostly black communities and attempt to organize a poor people’s 
movement.247 SDS leadership hoped that this new movement would provide additional 
support for SDS and the then growing militant black power movement in the U.S. This 
proved to be short-lived as SDS organizers believed the power structure to be 
unresponsive of the demands from below, noting the slow and difficult nature of 
community organizing and the little social power inherent in the poor community.248 
According to Carl Oglesby, SDS President from 1965 to 1966, “If you really wanted to 
strike a blow against the war, you would be working on the campuses, because it was the 
campuses that were generating the enormous heat, the enormous pressure, the enormous 
growth, and really shaping the political.”249 This failed approach to align with the civil 
rights movement forced SDS to reorganize and search for new direction. 
However, SDS’s initial failure to galvanize the poor was soon replaced by another 
issue that would bring the movement in a new direction. In 1964, when North 
Vietnamese PT boats fired upon a U.S. naval destroyer vessel in the Tonkin Gulf, 
President Johnson and the U.S. Congress approved a resolution effectively authorizing 
increased U.S. military presence in Vietnam.250 This government action strengthened the 
activists’ belief that Vietnam was in fact an extension of American imperialist policy. 
The SDS student movement, personally impacted by the draft and America’s policy in 
Vietnam, galvanized behind an anti-Vietnam War agenda. The campus environment 
provided real venue for campus sit-ins and candlelight vigils where increased radical 
rhetoric challenged America’s imperialist policies. It is during this period that the SDS 
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chapters evolved its tactics towards direct action that involved sit-ins and large protest 
marches.251 The influx of new members and chapters surfaced the belief that SDS was a 
movement and not an organization thus should not be influenced by an elite few or bound 
by organizational discipline.252 The SDS brand evolved into a decentralized structure 
that offered increased opportunity for chapters to advance utilizing strategies focused on 
the Vietnam War. By moving away from a hierarchical based organization towards a 
horizontal or flat movement, the SDS would became a “student power” movement 
focused on America’s involvement in Vietnam.  
Increasingly incensed with America’s growing involvement in Vietnam and as a 
possible sign of solidarity with the student movement, SDS organizers, students, and 
teachers arranged teach-ins that included the burning of draft cards.253 Student and 
faculty at the University of California at Berkley (UC Berkley) staged a series of protest 
movements during the 1964 fall semester that called for free political speech on campus 
and an end to the Vietnam War. At the time, UC Berkley and other academic institutions 
banned on-campus political activities, thus limiting the ability for students to effectively 
organize political movements. The UC Berkley protests symbolized a change in tactics 
towards direct action and were soon followed by a number of nationwide campus protest 
movements that were often confronted by police and local authorities.  
In April 1965, the surge in SDS membership influenced leaders to organize a 
highly visible protest march in Washington, D.C., that caught the attention of government 
leaders and then Secretary Henry Kissinger, who commented that SDS was representative 
of the “main force on the white New Left.”254 The Port Huron Statement may have left 
the door open for competing ideologies; however, the Vietnam War became the unifying 
issue for SDS. 
The anti-war protests effectively hijacked the SDS platform for a period of time 
between 1965–1968 increasing SDS’s enrollment to approximately 100,000 students, 
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many of whom were not aligned with the Port Huron statement or the New Left but rather 
drawn from the less radical working class directly affected by the Vietnam War. The Port 
Huron Statement was irrelevant to their purpose. This increased and diverse membership 
resulted in a new SDS convention that eradicated the Port Huron Statement and embraced 
an increasingly anti-communist agenda. The original, more socially focused members 
remained marginalized, increasingly frustrated with the direction of the movement. SDS, 
now fractured, lost its identity as a civil rights movement causing many to believe the 
organization’s grassroots efforts were essentially over.  
Noting this shift, then SDS President Carl Oglesby, during a speech at the SDS 
national convention in August 1966, stated that although there was a deep concern that 
something is wrong with America, “we need to develop greater clarity about what we 
think the world ought to be like.”255 The youth platform of SDS offered no political 
platform for change. 
The SDS and activists behind the New Left movement were confronted with the 
realization that despite their perceived belief that the American system was imperialistic 
and served only the elite, in being unable to draw upon a victimized poor populace, it had 
very little chance of appealing to a comfortable middle class still benefiting from the 
capitalist American system.256 The New Left “appeared to have reached the structural 
limit of its revolt.”257 By announcing itself as an anti-communist organization, the SDS 
had not only failed to align with a common radical collective but also left the door open 
for a number of competing ideologies to join the group. Chief amongst these was a fast 
growing student group called the Progressive Labor Party (PL), a pro-China Maoist party 
which had split from the old Soviet-oriented Communist Party of the United States.258 
During the 1966–67 academic year, the now more autonomous SDS chapters 
evolved from “protest” to “resistance” and engaged in more harassing tactics such as 
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prolonged campus sit-ins, large protest gatherings, and marches and direct confrontations 
with campus draft boards. These resistance tactics, although passive, effectively disrupted 
university functions often requiring police intervention. The resulting confrontations with 
police, some notably violent, served to galvanize members of SDS and created new 
talking points of protest against an imperialist America.259 
The following year, 1968, served as not only a tumultuous period for the U.S. 
with the assassination of presidential candidate Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King, 
but also a turning point for the student organization. SDS chapters, “restless and 
frustrated” in the search for “instant change” began to encourage and engage in more 
disruptive activities such as draft resistance and campus takeovers.260 Carl Davidson, the 
SDS national president, acknowledging the riotous tactics being employed by a national 
black power movement called the Black Panther Party demanded “either give us what 
we’re asking for, or we’ll shut this school down.”261  
In April of that same year, Mark Rudd, SDS chapter president at New York’s 
Columbia University, noting perceived racial discrimination at a local Harlem, New York 
gymnasium and participation by a Columbia University think tank in a U.S. military 
weapons program, championed the direct action strategy and organized a campus wide 
sit-in that resulted in five university buildings being occupied and shut down for nearly 
one week.262 Refusing amnesty for the student protestors, New York City police were 
called to clear the buildings, arresting more than 700 students with more than 100 
students and a dozen police officers being injured in the confrontation.263 Enraged by the 
forceful police actions, Columbia University students arranged a strike that caused the 
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campus to remain shut down for the spring semester. According to one of the protestors, 
the confrontations symbolized the beginning of militancy for the struggle allowing 
students to see “political conflict in overtly confrontational terms.”264 Subsequent to this 
event, campus flyers emerged that encouraged new battles utilizing such weapons as 
rocks, guns, firebombs, and plastique explosives.265  
Robert Siegel, who worked as a reporter at Columbia University’s radio station 
during the protest actions, recalled the effects of the police action stating that “some SDS 
members saw the sudden radicalization of kids who had been witnesses or victims of 
police brutality” adding “America was on the verge of revolution, they reasoned, provoke 
more Columbias, more police crackdowns, and then more radicals would emerge.”266 It 
is during this period that a smaller, more radical element began to take shape within SDS 
chapters. 
One of the most enduring images of the SDS protest struggle occurred in August 
1968 during the Democratic Party’s presidential nominating convention held in 
Chicago.267 SDS protestors, aligned with presidential candidate McCarthy’s anti-war 
agenda, were confronted by a Chicago Police Department determined to prevent 
hundreds of SDS protestors from disrupting the convention. The police, utilizing blunt 
force tactics, engaged the protestors, many of whom were arrested and/or severely 
harmed by the police.268 This direct confrontation with police not only symbolized the 
student struggle, but it also highlighted the limits of protest tactics against a stronger 
force. 
D. FRACTURE 
Consumed with an anti-war agenda, the decentralized SDS organization was no 
longer aligned with its original Port Huron socialist agenda and, outside of the Vietnam 
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War, still void of ideology. Seizing this opportunity, skilled organizers within the 
Progressive Labor Party (PL) quickly gained a foothold within SDS and received 
increasing support from the SDS chapters at Harvard University and other influential 
campuses.269 Concerned about increasing influence from PL and disenchanted by the 
failure of the protest movement to effect U.S. policy in Vietnam, more radical and 
traditional SDS elements formed a separate faction called the Revolutionary Youth 
Movement (RYM) to vie for control of the SDS agenda platform.270 As an opposing 
group to the PL, the RYM wished to recognize all student and working class Americans 
with the right to self-determination, a distinction not willingly granted by the PL. The PL 
faction, more aligned with communist ideology, saw the current working class as an 
“exclusive agent of revolutionary change” thus distinct from the student population.271 
At the 1969 SDS National Convention in Chicago, members of the RYM 
famously submitted a new manifesto tilted “You Don’t Need a Weatherman to Know 
Which Way the Wind Blows.”272 The manifesto announced the formation of RYM and 
outlined a transition strategy that would embrace third world revolutionary tactics in 
hopes of building a base of revolutionary minded SDS students that identified with anti-
imperialist and anti-racist consciousness.273 RYM, for the first time, offered an ideology-
based direction for SDS. 
Continuously aligned with the civil rights agenda, RYM members attempted to 
seize control of the SDS platform from PL and return SDS to its original socialist agenda 
of equality. RYM, whose leadership members included SDS chapter leaders Mark Rudd 
from Columbia University, Bill Ayers from the University of Michigan, and influential 
newcomer Bernadine Dohrn from the University of Chicago, all of whom were aligned 
with the revolutionary Black Panther Party movement were able to orchestrate a vote that 
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successfully removed the popular PL faction from SDS.274 The success of their effort 
effectively denied a majority of SDS chapters of its chosen Maoist platform. Now 
unopposed, RYM became the leading body within SDS and, in reference to their 
manifesto, became known as the Weathermen. 
The fracture and subsequent takeover of SDS by a minority sect was significant. 
In his thesis studying the path towards terrorist violence, Dean Olson notes that political 
violence is often a byproduct of ineffective or failed social movements. According to 
Olson, “the development of a revolutionary dimension and increased risk of violence 
occurs when various factions begin to fragment along ideological lines over 
disagreements about what methods to employ to achieve goals.”275 
Disenfranchised by the ineffectiveness of the anti-war movement and “arm-chair 
Marxism,” RYM attempted to reinvigorate the SDS civil rights and social inequality 
platform by calling for a Day of Rage in Chicago to coincide with the opening of the trial 
for a group of demonstrators arrested the previous for their participation in protests at the 
Democratic Convention.276 The defendants, known as the Chicago 8, also included an 
influential Black Panther Party leader Bobby Seale. Inspired by the confrontational 
tactics of the Black Panther Party, the Weathermen called upon SDS members to join 
forces in a violent struggle to avenge the violent police tactics used against them during 
the Democratic Convention. During a three-day period in October 1969, Weathermen 
members, donning helmets gas masks, and blunt force weapons, such as sticks and pipes, 
repeatedly engaged the Chicago police, engagements which resulted in a number of 
arrests and serious injuries.277 
However, rather than galvanize the SDS membership, according to Heath, the 
Day of Rage protest failed to garner large support and in fact served to further isolate the 
Weathermen from the SDS base who questioned their tactics. The one thing the riotous 
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Day of Rage tactics did do was establishing the Weathermen as a threat to society. The 
failure to garner the support of the student movement exposed the Weathermen’s mass 
revolutionary strategy as flawed. The remaining members of the Weathermen, estimated 
at no more than 150 people, were forced to find new ways to continue their struggle.278  
In December 1969, in Flint, Michigan, the Weathermen held its last public 
meeting, now referred to as the “War Council.” The result of the meeting was a new 
clandestine group called the Weather Underground Organization (WUO) and a 
declaration of war by Bernadine Dohrn that effectively marked the group’s transgression 
to terrorist bombing tactics. Forced to retreat underground, the WUO utilized a cell 
structure aligned with the group’s ideology and commitment towards terrorist bombing 
tactics. Already a target for law enforcement, including the FBI, the group’s clandestine 
structure was essential for survival.  
However, the Weathermen’s terrorist tactics were challenged early in their 
campaign. In 1970, New York based Weathermen, in an attempt to build anti-personnel 
devices to target a dance at the Fort Dix Army Base in New Jersey, accidentally initiated 
the device killing three of the five Weathermen present in the apartment.279 The 
subsequent public and media outrage forced WUO leaders, known as the Weather 
Bureau, to debate their own tactics and the ethics of targeting human life as part of their 
terrorist campaign.280 The group decided to avoid targeting human life but rather the 
symbols of the “imperialist U.S. government” and proceeded with a multi-year bombing 
campaign that targeted the U.S. Capitol Building, the Pentagon, and others symbols of 
authority, such as the New York City Police Headquarters building. The selective 
targeting campaign was intended to garner support and maximum attention without 
further alienating itself from the mass. By drawing attention to their cause, perhaps a 
silent majority would self-radicalize and embrace WUO’s less than lethal tactics.281 
                                                 
278 Ibid. 
279 Ibid., 174. 
280 Ibid., 182. 
281 David Ucko, “The Weather Underground: A Different Approach to Political Violence,” 
KingsOfWar, January 26, 2011, http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2011/01/the-weather-underground-a-different-
approach-to-political-violence/. 
 76 
However, their use of restrained bombing tactics still made them indistinguishable from 
more deadly terrorist groups, thus drawing them into a protracted war of attrition with the 
U.S. government they would ultimately lose. 
E. CONCLUSION 
As a campus based movement, SDS’s broad socialist agenda highlighted a 
number of social causes most notable of which was segregation and poverty. The 
increasing involvement of the U.S. in the Vietnam War served as a catalyst for the 
growth of the SDS movement beyond its northern-based campus presence. These new 
chapters or clusters, void a specific ideology or purpose, were able to frame the debate at 
the local level resulting in increased discourse at the yearly SDS national conventions. 
The increasing anti-war sentiment in the midwest and southern chapters resulted in an 
SDS base largely concerned with the Vietnam War and not the underlying SDS anti-
imperialist agenda. The founders’ desire for a participatory democracy as outlined in the 
Port Huron Statement shifted SDS from an organization to a brand to be interpreted by 
the individual chapters. Thus, the campus venue, effective for mass gathering and 
communication, also proved difficult to control since. Aside from the national 
conventions, SDS national leaders could no longer control the message and relied upon 
the influence and allegiance of its chapter leaders. This important finding possibly 
reflects the challenge of formulating and directing social movements web-based via the 
Internet’s communication platforms, since like the campus venue, social media is an open 
venue where users can openly express opinion and commentary. Hacktivists intent on 
change may be frustrated by the continuous discourse on the web finding it difficult to 
formulate and maintain an idea or identity. 
According to McCormick, this lack of popular support for the group’s political 
agenda in an otherwise permissive environment places decision makers at odds with each 
other, thus directly impacting the strategic environment of other factions like the 
Weathermen.282 As previously noted, clusters, or in this case the individual SDS 
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chapters, become cognitive layers within the larger discourse. The autonomous structure 
allowed for a horizontal decision-making process not subject to hierarchy or hegemonic 
authority. This structure makes the larger collective vulnerable since, as in the case of the 
Weathermen, transgressors “seek ways to free human individuality from the bonds of 
representation that would contain it.”283 The open and democratic nature of Anonymous 
suggests that those more skilled or passionate members, unable to elevate their ideas, will 
undoubtedly retreat from the larger collective to form smaller clusters or cells of 
likeminded individuals. 
However, the actions by RYM to remove PL from the SDS Convention platform 
in 1968 resulted in a RYM leadership position based upon weak bonds since the majority 
of the SDS base aligned with the PL Maoist agenda. These weak ties resulted in 
decreased support and action ultimately requiring the strategy of chaos and disruption.284  
In attempting to isolate triggers for the emergence of the Weathermen, it is 
necessary to examine a number of factors over a period of time. Leaders of the 
Weathermen became increasingly frustrated with the ineffectiveness of the protest 
movement and success of police intervention. In this sense, it is possible to view the 
perceived disproportionate reaction of the authorities towards numerous SDS 
demonstrations as influential towards the use of more revolutionary tactics. The 
Columbia University incident was just one of many clashes with police that ultimately 
culminated in the nationally televised and brutal confrontation between SDS protesters 
and the Chicago Police Department at the 1968 Democratic Convention. The subsequent 
appearance of campus protest flyers calling for use of weapons and explosives were 
significant indicators of building frustrations and move towards transgressive action. This 
is significant since global law enforcement efforts against hacktivists have increased with 
notable voices of resistance.285 
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The stated Weathermen ideation as noted in the release of their manifesto was 
distinct since it acknowledged factional support behind a purpose and ideology beyond 
the Vietnam War ultimately forcing a break from the base. In this context, the move 
towards terrorist tactics was not the product of a single decision but rather the “end result 
of a dialectical process” that gradually pushed the Weathermen toward a commitment of 
violence.286 According to McCormick, a person can arrive at this end state from a 
number of different starting points, as exemplified by the differing SDS tenures and 
geographic base of Weathermen members.  
However, the failed Day of Rage actions by the Weathermen already resulted in 
their becoming increasingly isolated from the SDS base. Increased confrontations with 
law enforcement only exacerbated a need for an increasingly violent organization to 
move underground. The move underground not only represents a flight to safety but also 
a predominant advantage for groups wishing to implement a strategy of subversion. SDS’ 
open platform and hierarchical structure was vulnerable to discourse and infiltration. 
Terrorist groups wanting to survive must become clandestine organizations. Thus, this 
apparent desperate and isolating move, although consequentially removing the group 
from its larger SDS base, also offered a layer of resilience that enabled it to carry out a 
multi-year bombing campaign. Anonymity is a significant advantage for any adversary 
and is an inherent trait of the Internet. 
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VI. EARTH FIRST! 
In the 1990s the Earth Liberation Front rose to infamy as a domestic terrorist 
group responsible in part for more than $100 million in damage to corporate land 
developments and businesses.287 However, radical environmentalist groups such as ELF 
were not idly born but rather evolved from the environmentalist social movement of the 
late 1960s and 1970s. One such movement called Earth First! spawned the concept of 
direct action under the veiled cover of a decentralized cell network all the while carrying 
the public message to save the Earth. Despite the popularity and acceptance of 
environmentalism, members of Earth First! evolved into more radical collectives 
responsible for hundreds of crimes and acts of terrorism that included arson, bombings, 
vandalism and harassment. Despite increased pressure, Earth First! and ELF have 
sustained and remain resilient to law enforcement actions against it. In order to 
understand how web based movements may shape and sustain, this chapter will focus on 
the evolution of the radical environmental movement Earth First! and associative 
organizational structure to identify factors involving the resiliency of autonomous 
movements. The autonomous cell structure, although resilient, also appears difficult to 
govern and possibly enables increased discourse within radical organizations.   
A. ORIGINS 
In the early 1960s, a political movement emerged that criticized environmental 
practices and was “characterized by not only a shift in philosophical outlook, but also in 
language and collective practice.”288 This period is often associated with the founding of 
the deep ecology framework, authored by Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess in 1972. 
Deep ecology asserts that all objects in nature have intrinsic worth and should enjoy 
special status in the world.289 Proponents for this philosophy believe that all objects in 
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nature are intertwined and essential to the survival of earth’s ecosystem. Disruption or 
harm to the environment fueled the belief that an “environmental apocalypse is 
imminent.”290 It is this entwined belief that fueled a new philosophical movement of 
environmentalism away from a political solution towards a spiritual one. Inspired by this 
new radical shift, a small group of environmentalists for the first time justified the use of 
illicit and/or criminal acts in defense of the earth. 
Concurrent with this philosophical shift was an increase in conservative American 
policy that favored economic growth resulting in the Department of Agriculture agreeing 
to open up millions of acres of federally protected land for use by the timber and oil 
industry.291 Frustrated by this decision and the lack of outrage by mainstream 
environmental groups, lobbyist David Foreman and other discouraged environmentalists 
formed an environmental activist group called Earth First!(EF).292 In defending the 
environment, the group believed extra legal tactics were necessary to fulfill their promise 
of “no compromise in the defense of Mother Earth.”293 
Aligned with the framework of deep ecology and deeply influenced by Edward 
Abbey’s 1975 novel The Monkey Wrench Gang, Earth First! employed a variety of 
rhetorical strategies to realign public opinion and policy on environmental issues.294 In 
his fictional book, Abbey highlighted the use of sabotage to disrupt logging efforts 
against the southwest forest region.295 Inspired by this rhetoric, Earth First! unfurled a 
300-foot black plastic banner down the face of the Glen Canyon Dam in Arizona.296 The 
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contrast of the black banner against the concrete wall of the dam offered a visual that 
suggested the dam was cracking. With the spotlight now on Earth First!, the group gained 
notoriety as a mobile and action oriented movement whose members converged on 
targeted areas and, upon concluding their actions, returned home to form other Earth 
First! oriented groups.297 This simple act of aggression, though harmless, effectively 
elevated attention and awareness of the group providing it a platform for recruitment. In a 
sense, the group’s cause determined its venue since the ideological focus was the earth 
itself. 
B. STRUCTURE 
Although founded by David Foreman, Earth First! had no central authority but 
rather resembled the autonomous cell structure proposed by Abbey’s in his fictional 
novel. In the book, activists discussed plans for a disorganized movement composed of 
small groups of anonymous cells that perpetrated economic sabotage throughout the 
nation.298 As the influential and founding member of Earth First!, Foreman exercised 
public control of the group’s messaging and initially its action via an autonomous cell 
structure loosely connected via the group’s quarterly publication called the Earth First! 
Journal. An important method of communication, the Earth First! Journal, was touted by 
editors as “an essential forum for discussion within the Earth First! movement.”299 It is in 
this structure that Foreman hoped to shape the actions and ideology of the movement. 
Anti-government activist Louis Beam in his article entitled “Leaderless 
Resistance” memorialized the use of clandestine, decentralized networks of autonomous 
cells as a means of resistance against tyrannical states. According to Beam, hierarchical 
organizations are ineffective against advanced enemies and have been historically 
penetrated by government agents. The strategy of leaderless resistance employs small 
groups or cells that “fight an entrenched power through independent acts of violence and 
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mayhem.”300 Absent direct command or a hierarchical leader, the leaderless cells are 
unable to communicate with each other thus maintain the advantage of anonymity, a key 
component for success and security. Although the autonomous structure lacks command, 
it does not necessarily imply lack of cooperation.301 
According to Liddick, because underground activists remain anonymous and 
isolated, “their success depends critically on aboveground members in the movement, 
who provide support and direction.”302 Thus, above ground operations are important to 
provide the proper messaging and legitimacy to the given movement all the while 
communicating agendas to underground operatives.303 Earth First! effectively achieves 
this through its publication of the Earth First! Journal. For Foreman, the journal 
provided an important communication channel to provide direction, disseminate 
information, and inspire underground activists with the benefit of deniability for 
subsequent cell actions. The journal also served as a source for activists to critique and 
discuss actions of the environmental movement and engage in discourse about the 
direction of the group. This form of communication, though consistent with the types of 
materials used by SDS, such as pamphlets, leaflets, and magazines, demands the 
important and scarce equity of time and resource. The ubiquitous nature of web-based 
social media platforms not only transcend this need but also provide vast outreach ability. 
As anonymous entities, Earth First! cells are influenced by the discourse and 
changing dynamics available via the Earth First! Journal. This effective outreach 
mechanism provides effective leadership and communication at minimal costs for the 
organization. Thus, above ground leaders, like Foreman, are able to remain engaged in 
the politic and attempt to bring new ideas to the masses. By playing the role of the 
intellectual, Foreman is committed to legitimizing the environmental movement with the 
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tangential support of the underground movement.304 According to Eyerman and Jamison, 
such overt efforts to elevate environmentalist movement into scientific discussion or 
“knowledge making” are an inclusive process known as cognitive praxis.305 Social 
movements, like Earth First!, combine science, thought, and action to further their 
cause—ultimately forming a “collective identity” behind the movement. The above 
ground leaders are required to institutionalize the movement if it is to survive as a 
legitimate organization. However, as the above ground leader, Foreman is the most 
visible and, by default, most vulnerable member of the group.  
C. DISCOURSE 
Formed as a direct action group, Earth First! intended to raise awareness of the 
environmentalist cause and directly challenge pro-industry policy in this area. Although 
worldviews on environmentalism suggest adherents have a “moral obligation to 
vigorously protect all eco-systems and those living within it;” deep ecologists believe that 
humans are the cause of massive death and destruction to life, therefore, “must be 
targeted and persuaded to change.”306 However, from its onset, Earth First! declared 
itself as an activist group dedicated to using non-violent direct action tactics focused on 
disrupting industry logging efforts. This was achieved via highly visible protest actions 
that utilized such tactics as tree sit-ins, blockades, and sabotage. Effective tree sit-ins 
were analogous to wars of attrition where protestors would sit in trees targeted for 
removal by the logging industry. These actions sometimes lasted for weeks and usually 
required police intervention to facilitate their removal.307 Likewise, other members 
chained themselves to heavy machinery such as bulldozers to prevent their being used 
until their forced removal. 
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These passive resistance tactics were aligned with the philosophy of deep ecology 
and the need to ensure that no harm comes to human or non-human life. Ascribed to this 
belief, Foreman and early Earth First! members took care to refrain from confrontational 
or harmful actions. Although the unfurling of the banner at Glen Canyon Dam appeared 
to most as a stunt, these tactics effectively highlighted the group’s message and increased 
the its ability to attract adherents and obtain funding. 
Many Earth First! activists were arrested for relatively minor offenses during 
these early protest actions; however, their actions also had the positive effect of attention 
and empathy to their cause. Increasingly agitated, loggers became confrontational with 
the protesters and, on one occasion, Foreman was run over by loggers in a pick-up truck 
causing permanent damage to his knee.308 Despite this aggressive challenge, Foreman 
initially resisted elevating Earth First! protest tactics. However, despite their passive 
protest efforts, Earth First! members received harsh fines and jail time in contrast to the 
lenient actions against confrontational loggers. Foreman, now limited by his injury and 
discouraged by the failure of the group’s efforts to alter policy, advocated elevating direct 
actions to include “monkeywrenching” or tactics that included burning heavy equipment 
and tree-spiking.309 
In 1985, Dave Forman published Ecodefense, a direct action or 
“monkeywrenching” manual that laid out the principles for utilizing direct action.310 
Insisting that monkeywrenching tactics are non-violent and ethical actions, Foreman 
provided detailed instructions for tactics, such as decommissioning bulldozers, removing 
survey stakes, and tree spiking. These actions were portrayed as a way to halt 
deforestation and development and provide activist groups like Earth First! the 
opportunity to elevate and create discussion around targeted issues.311 However, acts of 
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monkeywrenching can range from benign to the potentially very dangerous. The so-
called passive acts of machinery torching and physical removal of parts contrasted 
against the potentially harmful effects of tree-spiking. In 1987, a mill worker was 
seriously injured when a saw he was operating was shattered by a tree spike, an act which 
immediately drew increased attention to the group.312 The injury forced Congress and 
national forest supervisors to reevaluate the danger posed by environmentalists resulting 
in new policy that authorized denying access to national forests whenever environmental 
protests were expected.   
D. FRACTURE  
The autonomous structure of Earth First! comprised of both above ground and 
below ground members and, although highly effective at shielding identity and 
responsibility for criminal actions, also required an open framework for discussion. This 
open door policy, much like that of the Students for a Democratic Society, was 
vulnerable to being hijacked by aggressive discourse. Members were able to express 
diverse opinions via written publications such as the Earth First! Journal and used such 
venues to challenge the effectiveness of their tactics. Inspired by the publication of 
Foreman’s Ecodefense and the more aggressive tactics of torching and tree-spiking, Earth 
First! membership was increasingly and unwittingly drawn from left leaning Marxist and 
anarchists who increasingly advocated the use of such ecotage tactics as arson and 
vandalism.313 As a direct action group, Earth First! was increasingly blamed for actions it 
did not commit.314 Concerned with the increasingly violent direction of the group, 
Foreman attempted to return Earth First! to its original passive style. However, newer 
members, already maddened by the violent actions of the loggers, opposed Foreman and, 
utilizing the communication platform of the Earth First! Journal, proposed sustaining the 
use of violent direct action tactics.315 
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Foreseeing the increasingly violent discourse within the movement, Foreman 
offered members who opposed the increasingly violent tactics monkeywrenching and 
direct action a “no fault divorce” from the group resulting in some members pursuing 
other nonviolent environmental causes.316 Foreman’s belief that Earth First! could 
somehow remain detached from the activities of the underground cells was unrealized as 
their actions were increasingly associated with the public face of Earth First! By 
maintaining his belief that Earth First! could influence public opinion via non-violent 
means, Foreman fractured the group’s collective identity, previously composed of 
autonomous networks for direct action. Frustrated by the group’s inability to impeding 
urban sprawl, radical members believed that the environmental movement required more 
subversive tactics of “ecotage” that included acts such as arson and sabotage. Discourse, 
once elevated, provided a measure of internal and external conflict that influenced the 
direction of the movement. By the late 1980s, Earth First! had become synonymous with 
direct action and the increasingly violent environmental movement. Increased 
occurrences of sabotage against machinery and torching of home projects were publicly 
attributed to the group regardless of genuine attribution. 
An FBI investigation of Earth First! Arizona resulted in numerous arrests of the 
group’s members, including Foreman himself who was charged with conspiracy 
involvement in a series of sabotage attacks against a ski resort and power transmission 
lines. Foreman was eventually charged with a misdemeanor and $250 fine; however, the 
FBI actions signaled a growing interest in the group’s activities.317 Foreman’s effort to 
retreat from his rhetoric was directly challenged by an increasingly radical membership 
desiring more disruptive direct action. This challenge response mechanism was also 
represented in the Weathermen’s initial reactions to SDS encounters with the Chicago 
Police Department. However, the Day of Rage failed to galvanize the SDS behind the 
group’s more radical tactics and instead served to isolate its members from the student 
body. As previously discussed, SDS’s broad agenda failed to coalesce the movement; on 




the other hand, the ideological cause of environmentalism ensured a passionate and 
purposed following. 
Challenged with the left leaning movement of the group and law enforcement 
efforts to disrupt their activities, Foreman attempted to align Earth First! with mainstream 
environmental groups that were more engaged in public discourse and non-violent protest 
actions. Judi Bari, an original founding member of Earth First! and well-known feminist, 
disagreed with Foreman regarding the moderate use of direct action. While driving in her 
car as part of an organizing campaign to save the Redwoods of northern California, Bari 
was nearly killed by a pipe bomb suspected of being planted by members of the timber 
industry.318 Still opposed to Foreman’s passivity, Bari encouraged left leaning Earth 
First! members to leave the group and join the then nascent and more radical Earth 
Liberation Front (ELF), a radical environmental group emerging out of the United 
Kingdom (UK).319 In the September–October 1993 issue of the Earth First! Journal, an 
anonymous article announced the creation of the ELF. It stated that the ELF “is a 
movement of independently operating eco-saboteurs” that split from the British Earth 
First! movement, which has focused directly on public direct actions.320 Having lost the 
message, Foreman could no longer control the direction of the autonomous network and 
feeling “uncomfortable and out of place in their own group,” disgruntled members 
severed ties with Earth First! in 1990.321 
The Earth Liberation Front itself was a merger of environmentalists and 
England’s already popular Animal Liberation Front (ALF), a group that used destructive 
tactics of arson, bombing, and vandalism to intimidate corporate entities that profited 
from the perceived abuse of animals. Since many members of Earth First! were 
discouraged by the ineffectiveness of the group’s non-violent direct action tactics, the 
UK’s ELF represented an opportunity to align with likeminded activists across the 
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Atlantic. Already feeling the pressure from law enforcement throughout Europe, the 
chance to align with American counterparts increased the group’s resiliency and the safe 
haven of an autonomous network in the United States. 
On Columbus Day, October 14, 1996, in their first attack inside the United States, 
members from ELF, wanting to redress the “oppression of indigenous people 
everywhere,” attacked symbols of corporate America by targeting a Chevron gas station, 
a  public relations office, and a McDonald’s restaurant by gluing the locks to each facility 
and painting the property with political messages and the three letters E.L.F.322 Since that 
initial attack, ELF has gone on a violent multi-year campaign that has included burning 
down a Vail, Colorado ski resort, a logging headquarters, multiple housing developments, 
sport utility vehicle dealerships, and also the detonation of a gasoline bomb at Michigan 
State University (an apparent protest of the university’s genetic engineering research).323 
According to the FBI, ELF’s criminal tactics of vandalism and arson are responsible for 
causing over $100 million in property damage.324 The U.S. government has declared ELF 
as “the most active criminal extremist element in the United States” and “number one 
domestic terrorist threat.”325 Today, the ELF remains active, transitory and, due to its 
decentralized, clandestine and autonomous structure, resilient to authority. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Despite U.S. efforts to disrupt radical environmental activist efforts, the Earth 
First! and ELF movements remain notable and recognizable on a global scale. Foreman’s 
introduction of direct action tactics to a decentralized organization not only resulted in 
raising the public consciousness of environmentalism but also attracting the attention of 
authority. As a decentralized organization, Earth First!’s founder Forman effectively 
maintained an above ground persona that could argue environmental issues while 
distancing himself and others from the actions of the underground network. Earth First! 
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never publicly took credit for its monkeywrenching tactics but rather gained sympathy 
through it publications and more peaceful protest actions. This structure, though effective 
for self-preservation, also left the group vulnerable to increased radical action as 
evidenced by the discourse in the Earth First! Journal articles and autonomous cell 
actions. However, as Foreman realized, once accepted, ideologies are difficult to refrain. 
Perhaps spooked by his arrest or inability to wrest control of the Earth First! 
movement, Foreman ceased acting as the aboveground leader for Earth First!, and he 
went on to create the Wildlands Project and serve on the board of the Sierra Club, both 
environmental think tank organizations. However, his departure from Earth First! did 
nothing to impact the radical environmental movement. Today, there are several hundred 
Earth First! related organizations around the world.326 According to activist Darryl 
Cherney, “Many Earth First!ers have actually gone on to start new organizations with 
much stronger ‘no compromise’ positions.”327 
“Earth First! is a verb, not a noun.”328 This poignant statement reflects the 
resiliency of not only movements but also the ideology behind them. According to 
Loedenthal, names such as the ELF, ALF (a popular animal liberation group closely 
aligned with ELF in politics and tactics), and Earth First! “are freely adoptable political 
markers providing little more than an articulation of a shared politic and recognizable 
name.”329 The idea itself becomes the collection platform. 
According to Ingalsbee, environmental movements like Earth First! represent new 
forms of collective identifies that attract activist communities. The new activist identities 
form a collective consciousness for action.330 The Earth First! Journal or today’s social 
media platform provide “temporary liberated zones where dominant discourses and 
cultural norms can be symbolically countered, and alternative discursive practices –such 
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as identity- can be socially created.”331 Thus, much like the SDS before them, 
autonomous structures like Earth First! represent ideological platforms that morph into 
unforeseen and at times radical new identities that are resistant to technocracy.  
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VII. ANONYMOUS 
Over the past decade, a number of hacktivist groups have demonstrated their 
disruptive abilities utilizing the cyber platform. Many of these groups still sustain today 
and have active members willing to openly and publicly participate in social discourse. 
However, one of the most disruptive and controversial of all of these groups chooses to 
engage anonymously as a collective known as Anonymous. Unlike other hacktivist 
groups such as Electronic Theatre, whose members and leaders are openly engaged in 
discussion, members of Anonymous remain true to their moniker and, like many social 
movements before them, embrace anonymity as a necessary and essential characteristic 
of their cause. As a non-hierarchical collective, Anonymous bears similarities to the SDS 
and Earth First!, not only in structure but also its vulnerabilities of discourse and radical 
behavior. This chapter will review the evolution of Anonymous as a web-based social 
movement and identify unique and distinctive characteristics that, if uninterrupted, may 
enable this collective to become an increasingly disruptive force and security concern for 
the homeland.  
A. ORIGINS 
On October 1, 2003, a simple image based bulletin board started by a 15-year old 
in New York City received its first innocuous post by a user known only as “moot.” The 
board, 4chan, intended to host conversation around various anime and other comic based 
media, became very popular for its free cost and ability to post anonymously, an 
attractive feature for lurkers and posters. Those posters who wished to use the message 
board and not identify themselves were labeled only as “Anonymous.”332 In fact, 4chan, 
an online forum, in recognition of the favorable characteristic of anonymity, describes 
“Anonymous” as “not a single person, but rather, represents the collective whole of 
4chan.”333 This is an important distinction since research suggests that, behind the mask, 
people are willing to engage more freely on divisive subjects without the threat of 
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retribution or ridicule.334 The opinions of posters are objective and usually unbiased since 
unidentifiable posters cannot be isolated on the web by the members. The increasing 
popularity of the site caused the board to evolve from its intended focus into other 
message groups for random thought or discussion and soon resulted in 4chan becoming a 
full-fledged online community with nearly 18 million monthly users.335 
As previously discussed, online communities represent platforms for 
communication and discourse often resulting in clusters formed around similar ideas and 
issues. This was also true for 4chan as early users. They were comprised mostly of 
younger computer savvy members who, via 4chan and other Internet Relay Chat services, 
began to formulate loosely connected groups centered mostly on mischief and, in their 
words, “lulz.” a commonly used Internet phrase meaning “fun, laughter, or amusement” 
usually at another’s expense.336 According to Quinn Norton, journalist for Wired 
magazine, “lulz is laughter with pain in it” and “forces you to consider injustice and 
hypocrisy, whichever side of it you are on in that moment.”337 For Anonymous, “lulz” is 
the reason for being as it requires action when times are tough.338  
These clusters, though formed from open online communities, can formulate their 
own identities based upon rhetoric and action and, as a result, constrict its members to 
those willing to embrace their actions. This unintended consequence resulted in 4chan 
becoming a critical communication platform for likeminded hackers wishing to use their 
computer skills for mischief.  
In what is considered one of its first actions as a loosely organized collective, the 
“anonymous” members of a 4chan message board called “/b/” organized a large-scale 
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“raid”339 in July 2006 against a Finnish social networking site called Habbo.340 One of 
Habbo’s virtual communities known as Habbo Hotel was “raided” by members of 
Anonymous who, by placing numerous dark skinned avatars around the site’s virtual 
poolside, restricted entry to participants who were informed that the pool was “closed due 
to AIDS.”341 Anonymous’ actions were an apparent response to Habbo site moderators 
alleged tendency to ban users based upon the skin color of their avatars. Although the 
Habbo raid was orchestrated for the lulz, it reflected for the first time the unique ability of 
community message boards to quickly swarm and formulate action. Anonymous evolved 
as a loosely organized collective from 4chan and exemplified the capability of web based 
collective action. Although limited, the media coverage of the event highlighted the 
power of social media in organizing Internet raids with little resource. This is meaningful 
since the members of Anonymous were largely unknown to each other and still void of 
the philosophical or ideological direction consistent with previously discussed social 
movements. 
Now established as a collective, in 2006, Anonymous still in search of lulz and in 
its first foray into activism, famously targeted the website of white supremacist and radio 
talk show host Hal Turner. Primarily using DDoS tactics, Anonymous knocked Turner’s 
website offline causing thousands of dollars in damage and lost revenue to Turner who 
would later unsuccessfully attempt to sue 4chan and other community host websites for 
their actions.342 Perhaps more damaging, some members of Anonymous successfully 
exfiltrated email data from Turner’s server network that revealed Turner as a confidential 
informant for the FBI, thus impinged upon law enforcement efforts and caused personal 
risk to Turner.343  
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These early actions by Anonymous were important for the evolution of the group 
and its future direction. The tactics utilized in these early raids, virtual sit-ins, DDoS, and 
exfiltration, were reflective of not only the power of collective action but also the 
capability of the group’s few skilled members. Yet all were part of Anonymous and up 
until that point, motivated mostly by the lulz. Quinn describes this period as Anonymous’ 
inflection point and when the group realized the potential of collective action on the web 
and its ability to garner media attention.344 According to one Anon (a member of 
Anonymous), these actions represented the group’s instinctual drive towards “ultra-
coordinated motherf[*]ckery [edited].”345 
B. STRUCTURE 
Despite the increasingly antagonistic and criminal nature of their actions, persons 
targeted by Anonymous had limited recourse since any response or reprisal was futile 
against a truly anonymous collective. Targeting an amorphous blob such as Anonymous 
was difficult at best since the members were unknown not only to the victim but also 
each other. This was evidenced by Turner’s ineffective attempt to sue 4chan and other 
apparently unwitting virtual community hosts. 
As an Internet based collective, Anonymous lacks organizational structure and 
leadership; however, more than makes up for this with its “unparalleled sense of 
democracy” and collaboration.346 Inherent with most message boards and chat rooms is 
the ability and willingness to openly debate. Anonymous utilizes this platform to 
formulate ideas and action all the while respectful of the right to be heard. Not unlike the 
university campus of the 1960s or environmentalist journal publications, members of 
Anonymous, with the distinct advantage of anonymity, are able to speak their mind 
without fear of reprisal.  
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According to Halupka, members of Anonymous also recognized the distinct 
advantage presented by this cloak of anonymity and were emboldened by the fact that 
“retaliation on an individualized basis (was) unfeasible, as a faceless mob, the target 
could only strike back at the collective identity of Anonymous rather than those who 
comprised it.”347 The role that anonymity played in the formation of Anonymous cannot 
be ignored since, during the nascent stages of other collectives such as SDS and Earth 
First!, protest actions required physical presence and witness making its members 
vulnerable to reprisal from authority and potentially its group members. Faced with this 
burden, overt actors are likely deterred from taking particular action for fear of reprisal or 
punishment. Once targeted by authority, groups like the Weathermen and ELF, went 
underground and formed autonomous cell structures designed to reduce their visibility. 
This presents a real and challenging problem for authority since anonymous collectives 
circumvent the underlying assumption of deterrence that the threat is both “definable and 
identifiable.”348 Anonymous and its hacker collective enjoy the technological benefit of 
anonymity from inception and at no cost to its members. However, because the identity 
of its members is unknown, Anonymous “cannot breed trust-based morality between 
individual members” but rather are forced to trust in the collective as a whole.349 
Nevertheless, the benefit of anonymity combined with the technological advantage of 
coordination provides Anonymous with the ability to quickly identify and attack targets 
with little or no warning. 
C. DIRECT ACTION 
Still unchallenged and becoming more recognizable on the international stage, 
Anons, beholden to the discourse on 4chan, were upset with Church of Scientology (CoS) 
efforts to remove a video of CoS member and actor Tom Cruise from YouTube, citing 
copyright infringement issues. Anonymous saw the CoS action as a direct assault on free 
speech and the Internet freedoms they hold in high regard. Hacktivists have long held that 
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the Internet should be a free domain for speech and action. In 1999, a hacktivist group 
called Hacktivismo declared that “full respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms includes the liberty of fair and reasonable access to information, whether by 
shortwave radio, air mail, simple telephony, the global Internet, or other media.”350 
According to Samuel, this view is widely held by politically motivated hackers who hold 
that online freedoms and freedom of speech are “core values of Internet culture.”351 This 
was no different for members if Anonymous, who after debating the actions of the CoS, 
self-appointed themselves as guardians of free speech on the web. According to one 
Anon:  
I think it’s time for /b/ to do something big.  People need to understand 
not to f*k with /b/, and talk about nothing for ten minutes, and expect 
people to give their money to an organization that makes absolutely no 
f*king sense. I’m talking about ‘hacking’ or ‘taking down’ the official 
Scientology website. It’s time to use our resources to do something we 
believe is right.  It’s time to do something big again, /b/. Talk amongst 
one another, find a better place to plan it, and then carry out what can and 
must be done. It’s time, /b/.352 
Skeptical comments about such an attack or possibility of success soon evolved 
into increasing support as more members joined in the debate. On January 18, 2008, 
members of Anonymous once again banded together to conduct a series of attacks 
(dubbed Project Chanology) against the CoS that included such tactics as DDoS, prank 
calls, and overwhelming fax machines. Due to the open nature of 4chan and other 
message boards, skillful members of Anonymous were able to distribute their disruptive 
code or scripts to less skilled members who, because of their sheer number, were able to 
effectively overwhelm their targets, in this case, the CoS web servers. According to a Los 
Angeles Times article, Anonymous had roughly 9,000 members during the initiation 
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phase of Project Chanology.353 Although DDoS attacks can effectively disrupt 
communication with the web, the actions by Anonymous more importantly garnered 
national media attention once again elevating awareness of the group and this time, 
attracting global support. 
During the CoS raid, Anonymous set up a series of different channels designed to 
orchestrate and direct action. The channels were used to facilitate the group’s recruitment 
efforts and helped to sustain the group’s attack momentum by providing updates on the 
raid’s continuing success with Anonymous press releases. One such channel, dubbed 
“#press,” hosted a press release entitled “Internet Group Anonymous Declares War on 
Scientology.”354 
Along these same lines, on January 21, 2008, Anonymous posted a YouTube 
video, condemning the actions of CoS.355 In less than one month, the video received 
approximately 2 million views revealing the remarkable prominence and reach of the 
group.356 Utilizing the message boards and other social media sites, Anonymous called 
for physical protest actions resulting in “hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in nine 
hundred cities” around the world.357 Showing solidarity with the online collective, many 
of the protestors wore Guy Fawkes masks358 to conceal their physical identities and 
remain anonymous. The mask has since become synonymous with Anonymous.  
Project Chanology not only placed Anonymous on an international platform, but 
it gave the group a purpose. By aligning with the causes of anti-censorship and free 
speech, Anonymous unwittingly garnered the attention and support of a terrestrial-base 
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willing to join forces with the Internet-based collective. By formulating a true identity, 
Anonymous, perhaps fortuitously, moved closer to becoming a social movement.  
However, unlike terrestrial-based social movements, Anonymous did not fit the 
mold of social movement theory since it “lack(ed) the economic, cultural and structural 
components to succeed.”359 Since Anonymous has no discernible leadership, its actions 
result from the web-based discourse of its members. Through skillful use of the Internet, 
Anonymous has eliminated the need for structure and instead organizes itself via a 
“highly fluid system of networks and dynamic communication” capable of swarming via 
the web.360 This was evidenced by the remarkable support for Project Chanology.  
As previously discussed, the Internet, specifically social media, bridges the 
resource gap required by terrestrial based movements of people and money. Web-based 
collectives can quickly gather, debate, and take action with little or no warning 
capitalizing on the distinct advantage offered by the web. Samuel effectively argues that 
Anonymous and other hacktivist collectives represent a “new social movement” that 
poses a challenge to traditional social movement theory.361 According to Samuel, 
scholars have “yet to confront a movement defined by its common method rather than its 
common purpose.”362 Anonymous is a group formed by discourse on the web, and it 
adopts ideological justifications for its actions. The efforts to restrict access to a YouTube 
video galvanized a generation of millennials who grew up on the web. Furthermore, 
Anonymous now has a recruitment base and a purpose. 
D. FRACTURE 
As an amorphous blob void of leadership, it is difficult to identify points of 
discourse within the group since actions are defined by the majority. The literature also 
provides little insight as to real identities of the group’s members since the strength of 
Anonymous is derived from its anonymity. However, the successful raid against the CoS 
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increased notoriety from both the media and the general public making Anonymous much 
larger than just a group of hackers on the web. This increased following also piqued 
interest from cyber security firms and law enforcement both intent on disrupting the 
group’s activities. One such firm’s willingness to confront Anonymous altered the 
direction and focus of the hacktivist group.  
Aaron Burr, CEO of HBGary Federal (HBG), a computer security firm, intrigued 
by the actions of Anonymous, joined the 4chan boards to monitor the activities of Anons 
and become more familiar with the group’s identity.363 Keeping tab, Burr believed he had 
enough information about the group and on February 5, 2011, in an article in the 
Financial Times, publicly announced that he had “compiled a dossier of their alleged real 
names.”364 Considering this as both a challenge and a threat, certain members of 
Anonymous banded together to undermine Burr’s claims and orchestrate a direct raid 
attack against HBG and its employees. 
The Anonymous message boards were busy with traffic and members from 
around the world banded together to discuss the article. Two such members, “Sabu” and 
“Topiary” (later identified via law enforcement efforts as Hector Monsegur and Jake 
Davis respectively), who were meeting online for the first time, were invited into a 
“locked” chat room session by another Anon known only as “Tflow,” a skilled teenage 
programmer from the United Kingdom.365 The locked sessions ensured that only invited 
persons were allowed into the discussion thus extricating the group from the larger 
collective. The group was also distinguished in that it contained only those members 
deemed to be skillful or committed to Anonymous as noted by previous contributions or 
tech savvy comments. This is significant because it reflects a nascent effort by a group of 
likeminded actors to extricate themselves from the larger collective to begin more 
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focused and purposeful action. The new secure chat room was dubbed 
“#InternetFeds.”366 
Once isolated from the larger collective, the group initiated a series of actions 
against HBG that included an elevation from previous tactics. The Internet Feds 
conducted reconnaissance of HBG servers and identified a number of security flaws that, 
once exploited, offered them access to Aaron Burr’s email, Twitter, and LinkedIn 
accounts as well as proprietary source code for HBG. The group defaced HBG’s website 
and also extracted email data and source code, which was subsequently posted on 
pastebin.com, a popular plain text posting site used to store text online. The emails 
revealed HBG’s sensitive relationship with the U.S. government and company efforts to 
solicit government contracts to discredit WikiLeaks and develop undetectable software 
code for the government.367 The emails also revealed Burr’s intention to meet with the 
FBI concerning his findings on Anonymous. Irreparably harmed by the Internet Feds, 
Aaron Burr stepped down as the company’s Chief Executive Officer just a few weeks 
after the attacks.368 
The group’s willingness to intensify its actions is perhaps more indicative of the 
select collective’s sophisticated skillset. However, the group’s decision to act is also 
reflective of the challenge-response dynamic that suggests groups, in order to maintain 
their identity, must respond to threats or risk losing their acceptance. Increasingly aware 
of the threat posed by their actions, security firms such as HBG and law enforcement 
alike were motivated to identify and disrupt the hacktivist collective. The social identity 
theory suggests that Anonymous, now a globally recognized movement and/or brand, 
would be required to fight to remain the sentinel for free speech on the web. As an 
Internet-based group that values anonymity, recourse could only be carried out via 
disruptive web-based attacks. This meant that, once challenged, Anonymous or Internet 
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Feds, in order to maintain or improve its standing vis-a-vis the government and/or white 
hat security firms, used cyber attacks as a “public proclamation” to damage the credibility 
and status of its adversary.369 The attack against HBG was an effective primary response 
with secondary effects against the U.S. government. Anonymous was no longer focused 
on the lulz. 
During this same period in 2011, Internet Feds and other members of Anonymous 
were increasingly focused on global events, such as the Arab Spring and the Occupy 
movement.370 The group supported these movements by orchestrating website 
defacements against the Tunisian government as well as working with other hacker 
collectives such as Telecomix to facilitate discrete online communication channels for 
Tunisian protesters.371 Taking advantage of its now immense following, Anonymous, via 
a video on YouTube, effectively spread the word about a Canadian magazine’s call to 
“occupy Wall Street” (a redress about social and economic inequality in the United 
States) enabling a localized movement to evolve into a global protest targeting financial 
institutions and other symbols of social inequality.372 The existential efforts by 
Anonymous to support the terrestrial Occupy and Arab Spring movements expanded the 
group’s scope and purpose now unbound by a single ideology or purpose.  
The growing influence of Anonymous and the success of the Internet Feds efforts 
also brought more attention from police and anti-Anonymous security firms who 
increased their efforts to unmask the hackers. By trolling in the same chat rooms used by 
Anonymous, non-members, adept at social engineering (a significant trait of successful 
hackers) were able to collect chat logs from unwitting members of Anonymous that 
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ultimately revealed the identities of some Anons including Sabu and Topiary.373 Aware 
of their potential exposure and wanting to escape from the increased scrutiny, select 
members of Internet Feds, no longer able to trust the group’s chat room communication 
channels, retreated to private communications on a web server owned by Sabu. The very 
platform used to create Anonymous had now grown too big to trust, a fear realized by the 
successful arrests and of dozens of people with suspected ties to Anonymous activities.374 
It was in this private network that Sabu informed the smaller group about his 
previous exploits and began to assert his dominate personality. Described as a “principled 
warrior” whose rhetoric was “redolent of the most radical of sixties activists,” Sabu’s 
skills and strong personality elevated him to leadership status within the group.375 Parmy 
Olson, author of We Are Anonymous, an expose of the hacktivist collective, describes 
Sabu as a real activist motivated by social and political change. According to Olson, 
Sabu’s frequent run-ins with law enforcement made him “deeply resentful of people who 
abused positions of authority.”376 With a particular disposition towards white hat security 
firms and police corruption, Sabu was attracted to Anonymous because of its lack of 
hierarchy.377 Cognizant of successful efforts by the FBI and law enforcement to penetrate 
hierarchical group structures, Sabu believed Anonymous’ amorphous nature was resilient 
to law enforcement efforts against it. Now as a small cluster within the larger 
Anonymous collective, Sabu and select members believed they had effectively formed 
their safe haven. Sabu’s role as leader within the group also provided purpose. 
In May 2011, the group, now aligned with Sabu’s slant, launched another 
Anonymous offshoot called LulzSec, short for Lulz Security. With a proclivity towards 
exposing security flaws in corporate, government, and law enforcement networks, 
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LulzSec embarked on an indiscriminate 50-day campaign whose targets included a 
number of corporate, government and law enforcement agencies, including Fox 
Television, Sony Corps, the U.S. Senate, the Central Intelligence Agency, and police 
departments. A skilled collective, the group defaced websites and hacked/exfiltrated 
sensitive data and posted personal information and emails on public websites. A brazen 
Sabu exploited a security flaw in the public facing website for InfraGuard, a joint FBI 
and private sector information sharing partnership, and released personal information of 
its members. A Wall Street Journal article concerning the growing list of LulzSec victims 
stated, “Almost anyone is a target.”378 
In the midst of LulzSec’s chaotic campaign, the FBI, with information received 
from a white hat security outfit called Backtrace, identified Sabu as 27-year old Hector 
Monsegur and, on June 7, 2011, arrested him at his apartment residence in a New York 
City housing project.379 Court documents revealed that Monsegur cooperated with the 
FBI and quickly helped to identify “Topiary” as Jake Davis, a 17-year old from Shetland, 
England and “TFlow” as Mustafa Al-Bassam, a 16-year old male identified in England—
both of whom were subsequently arrested by the United Kingdom’s Metropolitan Police 
Department.380 
Though effectively disrupting this Anonymous splinter group, LulzSec and in 
particular, Sabu, were representations of real activists purposely exploiting the Internet 
for political ideology. Sabu’s radical expressions appeared based in part by his own 
perceived mistreatment and social injustice at the hands of authority. Much like the Days 
of Rage protests by the then nascent Weathermen, LulzSec’s purposeful actions against 
security, law enforcement, and other representations of authority were efforts to 
legitimize Anonymous as a political actor in as much as it was an effort to right a 
perceived wrong. 
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However, LulzSec was not alone in its beliefs. Another Anon, known as “sup_g” 
by the online community, later identified as Jeremy Hammond by the FBI, was a Chicago 
native already deeply ingrained in the activist lifestyle. Described as an “electronic Robin 
Hood” by Chicago magazine, Hammond participated in a number of anti-capitalist 
demonstrations before Anonymous or the Occupy movements were household names.381 
A skilled hacker, Hammond, at 22 years of age, was arrested for hacking a conservative 
website and stealing 5,000 credit cards for the purpose of charging donations to 
“progressive causes.”382 During a 2008 interview by Rolling Stone magazine, Hammond 
described himself as an “anarchist-communist—as in I believe we need to abolish 
capitalism and the state in its entirety to realize a free egalitarian society.”383 
During a 2004 DefCon hacker convention in Las Vegas, Hammond gave a 
passionate speech about the virtues of electronic civil disobedience and the need for 
hackers to unite and disrupt the 2004 Republican National Convention by shutting the 
power down to Madison Square Garden, the host venue for the convention. During an 
interview with Chicago magazine, Hammond reiterated similar overtures stating “As 
hackers we can learn these systems, manipulate these systems, and shut down these 
systems if we need to.”384 Hammond would later recount that it was during this period 
that he began to conjure thoughts of an insurgency movement called the “Internet 
Liberation Front” much like the autonomous animal and environmental movements 
discussed in the previous chapter.385 Later introduced to Bill Ayers, founder of the 
Weathermen, by a local leader of Chicago’s Rainforest Action Network, Hammond 
questioned the idea of willingly getting arrested as an act of civil disobedience stating 
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“The revolution to me is about not getting in their jails” and doubted the effectiveness of 
sit-ins and local petitions.386  
Hammond’s comments regarding activism are insightful as they portray genuine 
examples of the potential for hacktivism and initial attempts to create a truly disruptive 
collective. Hammond’s calls to action, though unfulfilled, reveal his awareness and 
radical inclination towards hacktivism in the proper setting. Hammond’s attraction to 
non-hierarchical structures, though reflective of anarchist ideology, also reflect a learned 
agent, possibly influenced by other radical groups such as the Weathermen and ELF. The 
Internet Liberation Front, though notional, represent Hammond’s significant appreciation 
for the power of the Internet. Outside influences like Ayers would soon be replaced by 
web-based influences providing an advantageous venue for action.  
Inspired by the surprising effectiveness of the December 2010 Anonymous 
attacks against PayPal, Visa, and MasterCard for their refusal to process donations for 
WikiLeaks, a web hosting site created by Julian Assange to publish classified U.S. 
government documents stolen by U.S. Army intelligence analyst Bradley Manning, 
Hammond joined Anonymous in chat room discussions and monitored those with whom 
he most closely aligned. Still the activist, Hammond participated in a number of physical 
Occupy protests actions and, discouraged by the repression of the movement, grew 
increasingly frustrated with the “limitations of peaceful protest, seeing it as reformist and 
ineffective.”387 However, as a hacktivist, Hammond joined Anonymous because, in his 
own words, “I believe in autonomous, decentralized direct actions.”388 Radically aligned 
with the anti-authoritative ideology of Sabu, LulzSec represented the new activist outlet 
Hammond had been looking for. 
Already an admirer of LulzSec and the group’s previous attacks against HBG, 
Hammond was contacted by Sabu during the summer of 2011 and accepted his invite to 
join LulzSec in a new Anonymous campaign called Antisec, a self-proclaimed effort to 
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steal and leak any classified government information and continue to target banks and 
other high ranking establishments.389 Regardless of direction, the conjoining of 
Monsegur and Hammond, two highly skilled and unidentified hacktivists, represented the 
potential for likeminded hacktivists to form a more radical cluster for direct action. 
Hammond was all too willing and able to participate in Antisec and at the alleged 
direction of Sabu, he and other members of Anonymous embarked on a significant 
hacking campaign that cost corporations and banks hundreds of millions of dollars and 
also resulted in exfiltrating and leaking of large volumes of sensitive data obtained from 
security firms and U.S. government agencies.390 
Under the direction of Sabu, Hammond hacked and exfiltrated large volumes of 
sensitive data from Stratfor, a geopolitical intelligence firm with strong ties to the U.S. 
government. Once obtained, Hammond posted over 50,000 pieces of credit card data he 
used to fraudulently process over $1 million in charitable donations, and he  also released 
over 5 million emails that contained sensitive Stratfor relationships with corporate and 
government networks.391 Hammond was arrested by the FBI on March 5, 2012.  
With the help of Sabu, law enforcement identified a number of LulzSec and 
Anonymous members effectively putting an end to the Antisec campaign. Many of the 
hackers have pleaded guilty in exchange for lesser sentences; however, Hammond 
received a maximum 10 year sentence for his actions. Yet despite their arrests, 
Anonymous still lives on with many operations targeting websites of U.S. and foreign 
governments, corporations, and a number of their targets perceived as threats to social 
equality or free speech. Anons still supported the global Occupy movement and 
proceeded to hack the websites of government agencies and banking corporations. In 
September 2013, Anonymous resurfaced by hacking and leaking over one million Apple 
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user IDs allegedly stolen from an FBI laptop (a fact later refuted by the FBI.)392 In an 
official pastebin statement, the group paid homage to Hammond labeling him as an 
“ideological motivated political dissident.”393 Though considered tame when compared 
to the period of time between Project Chanology and Antisec, Anonymous continues to 
remain a reactive body with the potential to strike anyone at any time.  
In his final tweet as Topiary, Jake Davis, just prior to his arrest in the United 
Kingdom, stated “You cannot arrest an idea.”394 Despite the physical arrests of previous 
Anons, Norton asserts “Anonymous is beginning to plot a course without them, doubling 
down on its political mission.”395 Speaking truth to power and closely aligned to the 
ideology of Jeremy Hammond, an Anon identified as “CC3” has claimed that today the 
group is focusing “less on defacement and more on quietly taking over infrastructure” 
adding “the FBI doesn’t have a clue about what we’re doing which is good.”396 
E. CONCLUSION 
Anonymous is the epitome of discourse in action for it was born from it. As an 
unwitting emergence from open web-based communication platforms, communicative 
discourse amongst tech savvy individuals evolved into a collection of likeminded 
collectives primarily interested in pranks and lulz. However, the power of the social 
media platforms such as 4chan fortuitously formed a collective void of purpose. Joined 
by the Internet, anonymous individuals engaged each other online formulating discussion 
and opinion that ultimately evolved into mischief and harassment. Joined only by the 
Internet, Anonymous originally lacked purpose and remained unaware of the 
authoritative power afforded by 4chan and similar web-based platforms. However, the 
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anonymity afforded by 4chan and other relay channels as well as the large number of 
participants on the boards resulted in dynamic causes like corruption to be replaced by a 
“dynamic market of causes.”397 However, as revealed by the open structure of SDS, 
playing host to a dynamic market of causes is not necessarily advantageous. In 4chan, the 
high levels of membership also brought with it a number of diverse narratives that made 
it difficult for action. Therefore, with little or no cost to its members, these open 
communities formed smaller clusters around identities formed by rhetoric and action. 
Anonymous’ non-hierarchical structure is loosely connected by the ideals 
formulated in web-based chat room such as 4chan. As an Internet based collective, 
Anonymous was born from its unparalleled sense of democracy and collaboration that 
enabled all members to participate and guide the message. Constant discourse and debate 
shaped daily action and at times elevates more influential members to take lead on the 
issue of the day. Unguided by a single purpose or ideology, Anons have been reactive 
and swarming around a cause only to return to 4chan and other boards failing to coalesce 
into lasting or sustained action. These loose ties or bonds have negative impact on unity 
and coordination making it difficult to form lasting coalitions.398 However, since 
Anonymous is a reactive body, its threat is always imminent. 
The lack of direction, purpose, and trust, ultimately led to the formation of smaller 
cells of hacktivists, such as the InternetFeds who, doubting the majority’s ability to force 
change, opted to form a more active coalition towards direct action. As a decentralized 
group of activist cells populating a number of different message boards, Anonymous 
began operating in a more secure environment. The independence afforded by this new 
environment allows for intimacy, flexibility, and adaptiveness that made infiltration 
difficult.399 As one of the most skilled and politically motivated members of his cell, 
Sabu assumed a leadership position of Internet Feds. According to Topiary, the group did 
not want to be constrained by the larger collective and its basic principles for targeting, 
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which focused on the ideals of free expression.400 For the hacktivist collective within 
Anonymous, this decentralized structure served to free Sabu and others from the 
ideological restraint of the majority and enabled them to pursue their own interpretative 
action. 
According to Biesecker-Mast, “confrontation” is a place “between meaning and 
antagonism, between hegemony and subversion, and between a movement’s promise and 
its inherent limits.”401 For hacktivists, the online collective is both its promise and its 
demise for the global reach of its communicative platform is also the source for eternal 
discourse. Competing with the dynamic market of ideas forms the basis for internal 
conflict that, when confronted by oppression, may force more deeply committed 
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VIII. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A limited amount of research had been conducted on the significance of the 
Internet as a platform for activism and the role of venue in the furtherance of social 
movements. Although a number of studies have been conducted on social movements 
and the praxis behind such movements, little research existed as to whether web-based 
social movements were significantly advantaged and thus a particular threat to homeland 
security interests. Until recently, hacktivism has been an accepted form of civil 
disobedience since it is accepted as a non-violent act of protest; however, the Internet as 
venue for disruption remain separated in the context of hacktivist research. This thesis 
has focused on whether the Internet and the availability of increasingly sophisticated 
web-based technologies provides activists a significant advantage compared to terrestrial-
based movements. In ascertaining whether hacktivist movements present a risk to 
homeland security, it is important to understand the potential advantage that the Internet 
provides.  
B. FINDINGS 
The sustainability of the SDS and Earth First! movements was in part attributable 
to the galvanizing issues they each represented as well as the structure that each group 
utilized for action. Once adopted, the issue becomes the motivator for the group and, in 
decentralized networks, easily enacted by the multitude of supporters within the cell 
structures. For SDS, the campus venue enabled collective action that for a while was met 
with only limited authoritative action. However, as the group became more popular and 
more engaged in direct action, repressive authoritative actions limited the movement’s 
ability to formulate change. Unequipped to confront the government’s security apparatus, 
the resolve of SDS’s followers weakened enabling more influential members to redirect 
the group’s platform, which resulted in increased discourse and debate.  
Likewise for Earth First! that, after a series of direct protest actions against 
corporate entities within the logging industry, also found itself engaged with a much 
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stronger authoritative agent capable of limiting the group’s actions. Unwilling to confront 
authority with violence, founder Foreman’s mainstream policies isolated more extreme 
members who believed that increasingly violent action was necessary to force change in 
environmental policy. However, the lack of direct control over decentralized networks 
lessened Foreman’s ability to control the group’s actions. Extreme Earth First! members 
formed more violent cell structures and allied with ELF. Thus, the life cycle of the social 
movements appears directly attributable to authoritative challenge and resulting 
discourse. Though galvanized, the single-issue groups failed to create change resulting in 
its demise and ultimate fracture. 
The life cycle of the terrestrial-based movement depicted in Figure 2 diagram is in 
part influenced by the findings of Armand Mauss in his 1975 book Social Problems as 
Social Movements.402 The development of SDS and Earth First! from mostly singular 
issues or ideologies that galvanized a targeted populace that when challenged, waned and 
became susceptible to discourse. Both SDS and Earth First! thus became most vulnerable 
at its height since the popularity and success of its growth and movement helped to draw 
many who were not directly aligned with its focus. Ironically, the successful growth of 
the movement is what also lead to its demise. Larger collectives also attract diverse 
members and the attention of authority potentially diluting its strength. The larger 
collective mediates itself leading to purposeful and mainstream actions. SDS’s use of 
mostly passive tactics, though successful at drawing media and public attention, were 
ineffective at forcing policy change. Efforts to move such bodies towards more radical 
action are ineffective as noted by the less popular and ineffective Day of Rage protests. 
Earth First!’s inability to curb perceived harmful environmental polices forced extremists 
to break away from the mainstream and formulate their own direct action network.  
In single issues groups, failure to create change not only leads to a group’s 
demise, but it can also force the fracture necessary for more isolated and extreme, 
members to create violent action groups. Already predisposed, the more extreme groups 
                                                 
402 Armand L. Mauss, “The Genesis of Social Problem-Movements,” in Social Problems as Social 
Movements, ed. Armand L. Mauss, 38–71 (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, Co., 1975), 
http://media.pfeiffer.edu/lridener/courses/spassm.html. 
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return to a pattern of direct action able and willing to confront authority. The cycle 
repeats itself until its resources are no longer able to support the movement. Continually 
challenged by authority, the Weathermen were forced to remain underground and 
eventually disrupted by law enforcement and a largely ineffective campaign of violence. 
However, unlike the Weathermen, ELF’s leaderless resistance movement of 
decentralized cell structures persists to this day in a somewhat formidable role for the 
environmental movement. 
 
Figure 2.  Life Cycle of Traditional Social Movement 
As web-based movements, groups like Anonymous derive the benefit of 
collective action from outset as hacktivists react to issues brought forth from collective 
web-based discourse. Issues are crowd sourced creating hacktivist actions that are both 
reactive and unpredictable. Thus, hacktivist groups originate further along the curve since 
they are spawned from the collective (see Figure 3). 
Since web-based actions are difficult to defend against, hacktivists formulate 
quick action that, depending upon their intent, may either be quick and decisive or sustain 
for a period of time. Anonymous, like SDS and Earth First! is a self-regulatory body that 
often results in mainstream action. Their protest tactics, though disruptive, rarely force 
change but rather elevate issues for greater public awareness. However, groups like 
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LulzSec are also reflective of extremists within the organization that are dissatisfied with 
mainstream arguments and splinter to formulate more disruptive action on behalf of the 
collective. These splinter groups, unwilling to accept mainstream thought or repression 
from authority, utilize their advantageous platform to engage in a repetitive cycle of 
direct action that may be focused or broad depending upon the issue. The actions by 
LulzSec were indiscriminate and targeted a number of private and corporate sector 
entities. The cycle ended when law enforcement arrested a number of the group’s key 
members.  
 
Figure 3.  Life Cycle of Single Hacktivist Action 
The difference with hacktivism is that when repressed by authority, the process 
continues since the operating venue is the Internet, which offers an endless and 
technically savvy resource. Unlike single issue groups, Anonymous is spawned from a 
multitude of ideas that continuously spawns discourse and action (see Figure 4).  
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Figure 4.  Internet as Source for Continuous Action 
In addition to the life cycle distinctions between web-based and terrestrial-based social 
movements, a number of other findings offer insight as to the distinct and concerning 
advantage enjoyed by web-based activists.  
1. The Internet as venue provides a unique advantage for hacktivists to 
mobilize and generate action; however, the sustenance for these actions is 
potentially undermined by the weak ties inherent to web based relations. 
Venue plays a specific role not only in the origin of the social movement but also 
the resource mobilization requirements necessary for a movement to take hold. A 
movement succeeds when it is able to mobilize and produce a level of response that 
influences policy and/or exerts political pressure on the state. Social movements rely 
upon money, resources, and labor for success. The SDS achieved limited success via the 
campus movement; however, the group was unable to garner support in neighboring 
communities and thus had limited mobility beyond the campus venue. Hacktivists have 
immediate access to global resource via social media and, with no monetary or social 
cost, can effectively identify likeminded individuals. The ability to quickly galvanize and 
garner support for any number of causes is a unique advantage provided by social media 
that provides a new global generation a real and genuine solution for the right to be 
heard.  
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Absent censorship, the Internet provides unique communication, organization, 
and mobilization advantages over traditional venues, such as campuses and localized 
meetings, enabling forum participants to seek similar interests within the larger 
collective. However, this unique advantage appears to be offset by the weak ties 
formulated via social media as evidenced by the quick dissolution of LulzSec, which 
makes the hacktivist’s goal for policy change more difficult. In contrary, the bonds 
formulated by members of SDS and Earth First! in more intimate venues sustained for 
long periods of time even when confronted by authority. 
2. The Internet provides immediate structural and security advantages for 
the formation of web-based social movements.  
The Weathermen, Earth First!, and its North American splinter group ELF, all 
adopted decentralized networks to achieve their goals of not only direct action but 
sustainability. When faced with repeated challenges from authority, the groups 
decentralized to create safe havens that not only increased their chance for survival but 
also helped to strengthen their resolve for direct action. Reflecting their confidence in 
decentralized networks, the Weathermen announced their intent to go underground. 
Hacktivists by definition already exist in a non-hierarchical, web-based environment that 
provides the necessary tools for a web based safe haven of anonymity.  
Social media platforms permit participants to debate more freely than traditional 
venues without fear of recourse and over time formulating ideological clusters in a new 
decentralized layer. Hacktivist groups such as Anonymous are proficient at using the 
Internet to formulate debates around a number of issues allowing discourse to dictate 
their actions. However, as a “dynamic market of causes,” the forum debates rarely result 
in action as the number of participants and issues dilute the majority.403 Security risks are 
posed by smaller collectives of more radically aligned hacktivists who, by the very nature 
of the Internet, can cause significant disruption. Formed from flat organizations, these 
new self-directed clusters can easily identify and isolate more skilled or radical members 
from across the globe to create a new movement. Thus, large collectives like 
                                                 
403 Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place, 123. 
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Anonymous, as a self-policing body, lose the elements of control and influence offered 
by the majority. 
3. Web-based anonymity provides a multifaceted and qualitative advantage 
that can be exploited by an adversary. 
As a collective born of the Internet, hacktivists have already gained the distinct 
advantage of anonymity as evidenced by web-based anonymization tools. However, these 
physical tools are overshadowed by the psychological effects of anonymity derived 
within larger collectives. As postulated by Chang, the effect anonymity has on producing 
uninhibited behavior is dependent upon group size; “the larger the size of the group, the 
higher the degree of anonymity experienced by the group’s members.”404 Social media 
provides a unique platform for larger masses to gather anonymously, which increases 
susceptibility and risk for antisocial behavior. Thus, the social media platform provides 
immediate return for more radical members of web-based collectives, who, unlike their 
terrestrial based colleagues, utilize little effort to achieve this benefit. The repeated 
success of DDoS attacks against corporate and government sectors are successful 
representations of otherwise unwitting participants in criminal activity. Unlike terrestrial-
based movements, which accept a level of risk when performing direct action, 
hacktivists, under the cloak of anonymity, can carry out attacks with little or no personal 
risk. 
4. Web-based anonymity provides a multifaceted and qualitative advantage 
that can be exploited by authority. 
The great irony in building anonymous collectives is that the true identity of the 
participants is unknown. Trust is developed overtime; however, unless the ties between 
participants are strong (an unlikely outcome of social media participants), large and small 
collectives are vulnerable to penetration. According to Lewicki and Tomlinson, the need 
for trust “arises from our interdependence with others” since it is necessary to “depend on 
other people to help us obtain, or at least not to frustrate, the outcomes we value.”405 
                                                 
404 Chang. “The Role of Anonymity in Deindividuated Behavior.” 
405 Roy Lewicki and Edward Tomlinson, “Trust and Trust Building,” Beyond Intractability 2003, 
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/trust-building. 
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However, this interdependence provides an element of risk since trust requires members 
to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions of another.406 
Investigators, using the same anonymization tools, exploit this trust and lurk inside the 
same hacktivists chat rooms and identify more radical or criminal elements for further 
investigation. Hammond and others within Anonymous, forced to rely on a level of blind 
trust, were victimized by the very anonymity they sought themselves. 
5. The Internet provides hacktivists a disproportionate platform for 
disruption. 
According to the FBI, since 1979, environmental and animal rights extremists in 
the United States are responsible for more than 2,000 crimes and over $110 million in 
economic loss.407 However, this pales in comparison to the damage already caused by 
hacktivists. In 2010, hacktivists, utilizing basic DDoS and hacking skills carried out a 
single series of attacks against Sony Corporation that resulted in an estimated loss of 
$173 million.408 Today, hacktivists can gain access to a number of sophisticated cyber 
weapons that, if utilized, can cause real and significant harm to America’s critical 
infrastructure. Yet as a web based social movement, the current and potential threat posed 
by hacktivists remains underestimated. Up until LulzSec, hacktivists have been portrayed 
in generally positive light by global media; after all, no one has died from hacktivism. As 
hacktivist actions become more of the norm, the public will become desensitized and less 
aware of their actions.  
However, rather than quell the hacktivist’s motivation, hacktivists may increase 
their level of engagement to retain their prominence. According to Jenkins, terrorists 
want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead; however, he has also 
acknowledged that some terrorist, like al-Qaida, want a lot of people watching and 
                                                 
406 Ibid. 
407 “FBI—Using Intel Against Eco-Terrorists,” FBI, June 30, 2008, 
http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/june/ecoterror_063008. 
408 Vamosi, “How Hacktivism Affects Us All.”  
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dead.409 If true, then more radical or ideological elements of a hacktivist movement are 
currently operating below their capacity since with little effort, they can equate the 
Internet’s equivalent for both goals.   
6. Hacktivists Are Reactive Bodies Thus, Difficult to Defend Against 
Anonymous reacts to any number of emerging issues; this makes tracking or 
defending against their actions difficult. Likewise, authoritative response to hacktivism 
has been reactive as well. Hacktivists are confronted subsequent to their actions, usually 
after potentially devastating losses or disruption to corporate, government, or private 
sectors in America. Efforts to defend against hacktivism will not likely solve the problem 
since, as a global phenomenon, localized law enforcement efforts are unlikely to resolve 
the issues that hacktivists are motivated to address. The Anonymous raid against Sony 
Corporation in 2010 and subsequent raid by InternetFeds against HBGary Federal 
exemplifies both the reactive and resilient characteristics of hacktivist actions. These 
actions also symbolize the strategic challenges of defending against hacktivism since 
hacktivist decisions and actions are unpredictable. This is concerning since, as noted by 
Daniel Hepworth, professor of Criminal Justice at Murray State University, not all 
decisions are made rationally, especially when made by those who are reactive and/or 
emotionally compromised.410 
C. CONCLUSION 
This thesis displayed the multifaceted functions that the Internet can play in 
advancing social movement or hacktivism on the web. It demonstrated the inherent 
weakness in the Internet’s architecture and how such open protocols have been coopted 
by threat actors for criminal and disruptive means. The easy availability of cyber based 
weapons have been used by hacktivists to cause millions of dollars in damage to 
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government, private and commercial sector companies and organizations who are 
currently disadvantaged in defending against the nature of the hacktivists threat. 
Purposeful use of these weapons has already caused significant harm to critical 
infrastructure in nations like Iran, Estonia, and the U.S.; however, hacktivists have yet to 
join the fray. Hacktivist groups like Anonymous are socially unable to formulate 
disruptive action beyond the surface of DDoS and web defacement since the collective is 
mostly unskilled and open ended to a number of issues that dilute their debate. Discourse 
and debate is their purpose as it increases awareness and identifies those issues with a 
need for action. As was the case with SDS and Earth First!, harmful acts defeat the 
movement’s purpose thus requiring restraint if it is to maintain the support of its majority.  
Projecting the course of hacktivism is difficult; however, this thesis has shown 
that social movements, regardless of venue, have the praxis to evolve and splinter into 
more radical groups. Purposeful actions are carried out by minority members who 
formulate their own clusters based upon ideology and competence. For hacktivists, the 
Internet accelerates the process of collective identity. The threat is realized from resulting 
small clusters that splinter from the majority in order to sustain a secure operating 
environment and endorse more forceful action. Resulting law enforcement actions against 
these groups do not necessarily reflect failure of the movement since, as noted by 
Christina Foust assistant professor of communication studies at the University of Denver, 
such repressive effects “are felt as a reclamation of agency and autonomy in the present, 
as well as the future.”411 Thus, the transgressive clusters within Anonymous and other 
activist movements have ability to inspire future action.412 The provocative comments of 
Anons subsequent to the arrests of Hammond and other members of LulzSec suggest a 
natural evolution of the web based social movement. Anonymous and other Internet-
based movements have a never-ending pool of resource. To successfully control them 
will require even greater resource, suggesting, “hacktivism cannot be stopped any more 
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than activism can.”413 The vulnerability of the Internet, availability of cyber based 
weapons, and threat of imminent action signals a hacktivist threat that is very real. 
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